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THE PERMISSIBILITY OF ACTING 
OFFICIALS: MAY THE PRESIDENT WORK 
AROUND SENATE CONFIRMATION? 
NINA A. MENDELSON* 
Recent presidential reliance on acting agency officials, including an acting Attorney 
General, acting Secretaries of Defense, and an acting Secretary of Homeland Security, as 
well as numerous below-Cabinet officials, has drawn significant criticism from scholars, 
the media, and members of Congress.  They worry that the President may be pursuing 
illegitimate goals and seeking to bypass the critical Senate role under the Appointments 
Clause.  But Congress has authorized—and Presidents have called upon—such individuals 
from the early years of the Republic to the present.  Meanwhile, neither formalist approaches 
to the constitutional issue, which seem to permit no flexibility, nor current Supreme Court 
doctrine, which contributes few bounds on acting officials, satisfactorily answer how much 
latitude a president should have to work around Senate confirmation.    
 
* Joseph L. Sax Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.  This 
work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International 
License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc/4.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, PO Box 1866, Mountain View, CA 94042, 
USA.  Please direct requests for commercial reprints and general questions regarding 
permissions to Copyright@americanbar.org.  Particular thanks for useful comments and 
discussions are due to Sam Bagenstos, Becky Eisenberg, Riyaz Kanji, Christina Kinane, Ron 
Levin, Peter Strauss, and participants at the Berkeley Law School Political Appointments 
Roundtable, faculty workshops at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and the 
Washington University School of Law, the University of Michigan Law School Governance 
Lunch, and the Michigan Law Student Scholarship Workshop.  I am especially grateful to 
Anne Joseph O’Connell for her generosity in sharing her thoughts and data as she conducted 
her own critically important research on these issues.  Thank you as well for terrific research 
assistance to Jake Altik, Brenna Ferris, and University of Michigan Reference Law Librarian 
Virginia Neisler and her excellent staff.  I greatly appreciate research support from the 
University of Michigan Law School Cook and Elkes Funds.   
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After summarizing different methods Presidents have used to rely on unconfirmed officials 
to perform the work of Senate-confirmed offices, this Article advocates a functional approach 
to the constitutional question.  A functional approach to acting officials possesses the twin 
virtues of pragmatism and constraint.  Presidents have legitimate needs to rely briefly on 
unconfirmed individuals, but functional considerations, including the need to ensure the 
integrity, competence, and democratic responsiveness of senior agency officials, weigh against 
long-term reliance on such individuals.  The Article concludes that because the Federal 
Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 authorizes overly lengthy service, the Act, together with other 
practices, is constitutionally problematic.  The Article concludes with reform 
recommendations.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too literal.  We must remember 
that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints.   
—Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 19311 
 
I sort of like acting.  It gives me more flexibility.   
—President Trump, statement to reporters, January 20192 
  
 Two years into the Trump Administration, tempers flared when 
President Donald Trump chose Justice Department Chief of Staff, 
Matthew Whitaker, as acting Attorney General in early November 2018, 
after Attorney General Jeff Sessions was pressured to resign and in 
preference to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein.3  Seemingly 
responding to the negative press, the President nominated William Barr in 
December, but Whitaker served for over three months before Barr was 
finally confirmed by the Senate in February 2019.  Whitaker’s choice was 
controversial not just because of the circumstances of Session’s departure, 
which suggested that the President had deliberately created a vacancy, but 
also because Whitaker, unlike Rosenstein, was not Senate-confirmed in any 
current role, yet possessed extensive powers in that office.  Those powers 
presumably included the power to remove Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller.4  Around that same time, in January and February 2019, the 
Departments of Defense and Interior, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), and the Social Security Administration (SSA) were all 




1. Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931). 
2. Brett Samuels, Trump: ‘No Hurry’ to Name Permanent Replacements for Acting Cabinet Members, 
HILL (Jan. 6, 2019, 4:33 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/424088-
trump-no-hurry-to-name-permanent-replacements-for-acting-cabinet. 
3. E.g., Editorial, Matthew Whitaker and the Corruption of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://nyti.ms/2DqL3lX (noting the “storm of legal questions” set off by the Whitaker 
appointment).  Among other objections, the State of Maryland filed a suit challenging the 
legality of Whitaker’s appointment.  E.g., Charlie Savage, Whitaker’s Appointment as Acting 
Attorney General Faces Court Challenge, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2DeD63j. 
4. E.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602, 653–54 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(affirming appointment of Special Counsel Robert Mueller by Deputy Attorney General 
Rosenstein serving as acting Attorney General following Attorney General Session’s recusal). 
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confirmed to head those agencies.5  As of writing, in November 17, 2020, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has not had a Senate-confirmed 
head since April 2019, when Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen was asked to resign.6  
Instead, for well over 500 days, DHS has been run by a series of acting 
officials, most recently Chad Wolf, Undersecretary for Strategy, Policy, and 
Plans, whose naming provoked opposition from both the left and the right.7  
The President finally formally submitted Wolf’s nomination to the Senate in 
September 2020,8 but the nomination was not filed until after the rise of 
public controversy over Wolf’s service in the summer of 2020, including a 
federal court ruling as well as a Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
opinion that Wolf’s service was illegal because his naming was not authorized 
by an order of succession valid under the relevant statute.9  Wolf has taken 
 
5. All data is available at the Partnership for Public Service/Washington Post Political 
Appointee Tracker.  See Tracking How Many Key Positions Trump Has Filled So Far, WASH. POST 
[hereinafter Partnership/Post Appointee Tracker], https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics
/politics/trump-administration-appointee-tracker/database/ (last updated Nov. 16, 2020, 9:12 
AM).  At the Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary Patrick Shanahan’s service as acting 
Secretary was followed by that of Army Secretary Mark Esper and then Navy Secretary Richard 
Spencer.  See Helene Cooper, Jim Mattis, Defense Secretary, Resigns in Rebuke of Trump’s Worldview, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2GyFDIQ; Jim Garamone, Esper Nominated as 
Defense Secretary, Spencer Now Acting Secretary, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (July 15, 2019), https://www.def
ense.gov/explore/story/Article/1905424/esper-nominated-as-defense-secretary-spencer-now-
acting-secretary/.  Andrew Wheeler served as acting Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Administrator, and David Bernhardt served as acting Secretary of the Interior.  Wheeler and 
Bernhardt have since been confirmed.   
6. Mara Liasson, Kirstjen Nielsen’s DHS Departure Means 3 Major Departments Will Have Acting 
Secretaries, NPR (Apr. 8, 2019, 4:26 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/08/711169740/kirs
tjen-nielsens-dhs-departure-means-3-major-departments-will-have-acting-secre. 
7. See Partnership/Post Appointee Tracker, supra note 5 (reporting resignation of Nielsen 
on April 24, 2019); Quinn Owen & Luke Barr, Chad Wolf Confirmed as Acting Homeland Security 
Chief, ABC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2019, 11:35 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/chad-wolf-
confirmed-acting-homeland-security-chief/story?id=66989973 (noting opposition to Wolf); 
Colleen Long, McAleenan, Acting Homeland Security Secretary, Stepping Down, AP NEWS (Oct. 11, 
2019), https://apnews.com/41d8075b43e243beb7c327fde5a3b091. 
8. See Partnership/Post Appointee Tracker, supra note 5 (stating Wolf nomination 
announced in August 2020 and referred to Senate committee in September 2020). 
9. See id. (regarding vacancy); Aaron Blake, Trump’s Portland Crackdown Is Controversial. The 
Man Spearheading It Might Be Doing So Illegally, WASH. POST (July 22, 2020, 12:39 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/22/trumps-actions-portland-are-controv
ersial-man-spearheading-them-might-be-doing-so-illegally/ (noting legal controversies over 
Wolf’s service); Casa de Maryland, Inc. v. Wolf, No. 8:20-cv-02118-PX, 2020 WL 5500165, at 
*23 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 2020) (issuing preliminary injunction and finding Wolf’s appointment as 
acting Secretary was likely invalid because he was not named pursuant to a valid order of 
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numerous controversial actions while purporting to act as Secretary of 
Homeland Security, including issuing policies to impede work authorization 
for asylum applicants and ordering federal law enforcement officials to 
intervene in protests in Portland, Oregon.10 
Acting and other individuals unconfirmed for the role have also carried out 
the responsibilities of numerous Senate-confirmed Executive Branch positions 
below the Cabinet secretary level, including the Director of the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM)11 and the directors of the Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).12  As of writing, in 
November 17, 2020, no nominations whatsoever have been submitted for 
some of these roles.13  All of this has prompted concerns that too much 
Executive Branch work has been carried out by “way too many” unconfirmed 
agency leaders.14  Federal courts have ruled not only that the acting Secretary 
of Homeland Security is not legally serving, but also the acting Director of the  
 
 
succession); Dep’t of Homeland Sec., File No. B-332451, at 1 (U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off. 
Aug. 14, 2020) [hereinafter DHS Decision], https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/708944.pdf 
(finding Wolf’s appointment as acting Secretary invalid because he was not named pursuant to 
valid order of succession). 
10.  Lawsuits were filed in Summer 2020 challenging these and other actions, including 
on the ground that Wolf could not legally serve as acting Secretary.  E.g., Casa de Maryland, 
Inc., 2020 WL 5500165, at *23; Complaint ¶ 64, Don’t Shoot Portland v. Wolf, No.1:20-cv-
02040-CRC (D.D.C. July 27, 2020) (challenging legality of Wolf’s service in connection with 
Operation Diligent Valor); Complaint ¶ 90, Santa Fe Dreamers Project v. Wolf, No. 1:20-cv-
02465 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2020) (advancing similar arguments to Don’t Shoot Portland v. Wolf); see 
also Harrison Cramer, Legal Challenges Descend on Trump’s Acting DHS Head, NAT’L J. (July 28, 
2020, 8:00 PM), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/708747/legal-challenges-descend-on-
trumps-acting-dhs-head?.   
11. See Scott Streater, Bernhardt Names Pendley as Acting BLM Chief, E&E NEWS (July 29, 
2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060807233; COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFS., 114TH CONG., U.S. GOV’T POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS 89 
(Comm. Print 2016) [hereinafter PLUM BOOK] (noting that Deputy Director for Programs and 
Policy is a noncareer appointment). 
12. See Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Maggie Haberman, Trump to Name Chad Wolf as Acting 
Secretary, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2019), https://nyti.ms/34lJwYz (noting the chief of U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is serving in an acting capacity as well). 
13. See infra notes 104–107 and accompanying text. 
14. Juliet Eilperin et al., ‘It’s Way Too Many’: As Vacancies Pile up in Trump Administration, 
Senators Grow Concerned, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpos
t.com/national/health-science/its-way-too-many-as-vacancies-pile-up-in-trump-administr
ation-senators-grow-concerned/2019/02/03/c570eb94-24b2-11e9-ad53-824486280311_
story.html?utm_term=.a5b09a4286ef (“The president has told others it makes the acting 
secretaries more ‘responsive,’ an administration official said.”). 
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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) and the acting Director of 
BLM.15  Nonetheless, all still remain in place.16 
Although extensive, the Trump Administration’s use of acting officials has 
hardly been unique.17  President-elect Joe Biden—expected to be the 46th 
President of the United States as this piece went to press in early November, 
2020—will undoubtedly rely upon acting officials as well.   
Indeed, acting officials have served in the federal government since the 
Washington Administration.18  Congress began enacting so-called vacancies 
statutes, authorizing officials to “act” in Senate-confirmed posts, in 1792, 
starting with the leadership of the Departments of State, Treasury, and 
War.19  Congress’s most recent enactment of this sort, the Federal Vacancies 
Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), authorizes generous periods of acting service 
of at least 210 days. 
All recent Presidents have relied significantly on acting officials in Senate-
confirmed roles.  Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell has documented 
presidential reliance on acting officers since the Reagan Administration.20  As 
of January 2020, O’Connell reported cumulative reliance on 147 acting 
officials in Cabinet secretary positions since January 1981, the start of the 
Reagan Administration, compared with 171 confirmed officials and three 
recess-appointed Cabinet secretaries.21  Reagan relied on eleven acting 
Cabinet secretaries for at least ten days each, and Obama relied on fourteen 
acting Cabinet secretaries for at least ten days each; meanwhile, nearly all of 
Trump’s acting Cabinet secretaries (twenty-seven of thirty) have served for 
 
15. Bullock v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 4:20-cv-00062-BMM, 2020 WL 5746836, at 
*11 (D. Mont. Sept. 25, 2020) (finding acting Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Director 
Pendley’s service illegal); Casa de Maryland, Inc., 2020 WL 5500165, at *23 (finding acting 
Secretary Wolf’s service illegal); L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24–26, 29 (D.D.C. 
2020) (finding acting USCIS Director Cuccinelli’s service illegal). 
16. Lisa Friedman, Judges Tell Trump His Officials Are Serving Illegally. He Does Nothing, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3iuxcMd (noting that Interior Department responded 
to ruling by “[t]weak[ing Pendley’s] title”). 
17. See ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., ACTING AGENCY 
OFFICIALS AND DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY 21 (2019), https://www.acus.gov/sites/defaul
t/files/documents/final-report-acting-agency-officials-12012019.pdf (“President Trump’s 
acting Secretaries have served longer, on average, than recent Administrations . . . . Because 
there are far more long-term acting Secretaries in this Administration, in total, their tenure is 
much longer.”). 
18. See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra note 252 and accompanying text. 
20. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Actings, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 613, 643 (2020). 
21. Id. at 642. 
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at least ten days.22  The Trump Administration has relied on acting Cabinet 
secretaries for more days than any earlier administrations, even comparing 
the first three years of a single term with earlier two-term Presidents—and 
even though the Senate was the same party as the President for two years.23 
Presidents also have relied on acting and other unconfirmed officials to 
carry out the responsibilities of Senate-confirmed agency leadership posts 
below the Cabinet secretary level.  These posts include heads of other 
agencies residing within the agency, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, 
inspectors general, and the like.24  As of September 10, 2019, to choose a 
date roughly two-thirds of the way through the Trump Administration’s 
first term, the “appointee tracker” run jointly by the nonprofit Partnership 
for Public Service and The Washington Post reported that of 732 “key” 
posts, 480 were occupied by Senate-confirmed individuals, leaving 252 
vacant—a one-third vacancy rate.25  Furthermore, 144 positions had no 
nominee at all.26 
 
22. Id. at 643. 
23. See id. at 646 (“[T]otal tenures of acting officials in the Trump Administration are 
much longer than in previous ones . . . .”); id. at 665 (acting officials in Cabinet secretary 
positions, excluding very short periods of service, have served on average from fifty to sixty-
five days in recent administrations). 
24. See generally Partnership/Post Appointee Tracker, supra note 5 (listing vacancies in 
such “key” Senate-confirmed positions); PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: 
FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY (1995).  Critics have argued 
strongly that the number of agency positions subject to confirmation should be reduced.  See 
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies through Filibuster Reform? An 
Examination of Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 DUKE L.J. 1645, 1695 (2015).  
Congress has made small moves in this direction.  See id. (discussing the bipartisan Presidential 
Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011). 
25. See Partnership/Post Appointee Tracker, supra note 5 (as of September 10, 2019).  
The tracker includes certain posts excluded by O’Connell, such as independent agency posts.  
See generally id. (identifying “732 key positions requiring Senate confirmation”). 
26. See id. (as of September 10, 2019).  According to the 2016 Plum Book, statutes require 
presidential appointment and Senate confirmation for 1,248 Executive Branch positions, 
ranging from Cabinet secretaries to positions with little policymaking authority, such as 
members of the Barry Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in Education Foundation.  See 
PLUM BOOK, supra note 11.  I calculated this figure by searching the Plum Book for all “PAS” 
positions and subtracting legislative positions.  The Plum Book may contain errors.  For 
example, although a 2011 statute removed the confirmation requirement for numerous 
Assistant Secretaries for Public Affairs, including at the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, see Pub. L. No. 112-166, § 2(g) 126 Stat. 1283, 1285 (2012), that position was 
still listed as a “PAS” position in the Plum Book.  See PLUM BOOK, supra note 11, at 83.  Thanks 
to Anne Joseph O’Connell for identifying this issue. 
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As O’Connell reported in 2009 with respect to similar positions in 
presidential administrations from Reagan through George W. Bush, “[b]y 
one measure, Senate-confirmed positions were empty (or filled by acting 
officials), on average, one-quarter of the time over these administrations.”27  
While the numbers cannot be precisely compared, the Trump Administration 
appears to have only deepened this trend. 
In short, we regularly face the specter of missing Senate-confirmed officials 
in the agencies.  Presidents have used Vacancies Act authorities and other 
means—notably internal delegations of authority—to place unconfirmed 
individuals in these posts or to assign them the responsibilities of the posts.28  
The Clinton Administration used delegation to allocate the powers of three 
important Senate-confirmed Justice Department offices—the Solicitor 
General, the head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), and the Assistant 
Attorney General for Civil Rights—to unconfirmed officials.29 
Service by acting officials might be necessary because a Senate-confirmed 
officer has died, become ill, been fired, or resigned, especially at a time of 
presidential transition.  Submitting a nomination on short order for every 
vacant Senate-confirmed office might be overwhelming or infeasible.30  
Senate recalcitrance in considering a nomination also might result in a 
persistent vacancy. 
Further, a President might delay (or not submit) a nomination and rely on 
an acting official for more strategic reasons.  Presidential delays in forwarding 
nominations to the Senate have been significant, particularly for 
appointments below the Cabinet secretary level.  For example, O’Connell 
calculates, through the George W. Bush Administration, a mean nomination 
delay for agency heads (below Cabinet level) of 173 days.31 
 
27. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 913, 921 (2009).  O’Connell’s list of positions totals roughly 300, depending on the 
administration.  See id. at 956.  She excludes ambassadors and United States Attorneys from 
her count, as well as members of boards, government corporations, and independent agencies. 
28. See infra notes 132–134 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
30. On average, during his first year, Obama took 130.5 days to nominate individuals 
for these positions, compared with 142.3 days for President George W. Bush; meanwhile, 
Senate confirmation took, on average, 60.8 days for Obama’s nominees during this period 
and 57.9 days for President George W. Bush’s nominees.  See ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, CTR. 
FOR AM. PROGRESS, WAITING FOR LEADERSHIP: PRESIDENT OBAMA’S RECORD IN STAFFING 
KEY AGENCY POSITIONS AND HOW TO IMPROVE THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 2 (2010), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/04/pdf/dww_appoint
ments.pdf.  O’Connell notes that the statistics underestimate the length of the nomination 
process, as they exclude positions where there were no nominations in the first year.  See id. 
31. See O’Connell, supra note 27, at 967. 
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A President also might wish to select, as an acting official, someone for 
whom Senate confirmation is unlikely, including because of unacceptable 
policy commitments.32  As Professor Christina Kinane has found, Presidents 
may even prefer leaving positions outright empty under some 
circumstances.33  But even if an office appears “empty,” with neither a 
Senate-confirmed nor an acting official, someone often purports to exercise 
its authority.34 
Presidents might rely on unconfirmed individuals to help politicize 
agencies, in the nonpejorative sense of ensuring that agency leadership 
policy preferences closely resemble the President’s.35  Relying on acting 
officials and other unconfirmed individuals might also give a President freer 
rein to distribute “spoils” to loyalists, including campaign workers, to use 
more agency posts for patronage, and perhaps even to choose individuals 
whose record and commitments raise integrity-related concerns or conflicts 
of interest.36 
But is such presidential reliance upon acting officials constitutional?  The 
Appointments Clause requires the “Advice and Consent of the Senate” for 
so-called “principal” officers and for “inferior” officers whose appointment 
is not otherwise provided for “by law.”37  It specifically authorizes unilateral 
presidential appointments to such positions in the so-called “Recess 
Appointment Clause,” under which the President may “fill up all Vacancies 
 
32. See Christina M. Kinane, Control without Confirmation: The Politics of Vacancies 
in Presidential Appointments 5–6 (Nov. 14, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://harris.uc
hicago.edu/files/kinane_harris_2019.pdf (“[C]urrent theories of appointments maintain that 
presidents’ choices over agency leadership are constrained by the extent to which Senate 
preferences deviate from those of the president.”); e.g., Burgess Everett & Eliana Johnson, 
Republicans Ready to Quash Cuccinelli, POLITICO, (June 4, 2019, 6:24 PM), https://www.politico.c
om/story/2019/06/04/cuccinelli-immigration-nomination-1353314 (anticipating Senate 
opposition, former and current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials predicted 
the President “may seek to install Cuccinelli at USCIS in an acting capacity”). 
33. See Kinane, supra note 32 (“[E]mpty posts and interim appointees have been in the 
president’s toolbox . . . for decades.”). 
34. See infra text accompanying notes 132–134 (elucidating use of delegations of authority). 
35. See infra text accompanying notes 48–52 (discussing Barron and Moe on politicization). 
36. See infra text accompanying notes 321–325 (considering the Office of Presidential 
Personnel (OPP)). 
37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing that the President “shall nominate, and by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for . . . .” Congress may vest the 
appointment of inferior officers elsewhere). 
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that may happen during the Recess of the Senate,”38 but otherwise does not 
speak expressly to this question. 
Dean John Manning has argued that methods of appointment under the 
Appointments Clause are among the specific constitutional “context-specific 
choices” that interpreters should be loath to disturb, even if Congress sought 
to authorize expanded powers of appointment.39  Prominent Washington 
attorneys Neal Katyal and George Conway III particularly called out 
Matthew Whitaker’s selection as acting Attorney General as unconstitutional 
and violative of the “explicit, textually precise design” of the Appointments 
Clause.40  Justice Thomas might agree, based on his concurrence in NLRB v. 
SW General, Inc.,41 where he noted that “[a]ppointing principal officers under 
the FVRA . . . raises grave constitutional concerns.”42 
These critics wish to preserve the critical role of Senate confirmation in 
selecting principal officers and many inferior officers under the 
Appointments Clause.  While central, of course, that is not the only issue at 
stake.  We also must have a working Executive Branch, a value recognized 
and embodied in other constitutional clauses.  Congress itself has, historically 
and of late, broadly authorized acting officials.  Numerous past Presidents 
have relied on such officials, and that is likely to continue.  Both the executive 
conduct and the purported legislative authorization raise constitutional 
issues.  A close assessment of these issues should guide courts applying the 
Appointments Clause.  It also might guide legislative reforms to narrow 
statutory authorization of acting officials. 
 
 
38. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (providing that such Commissions “shall expire at the End of their 
next Session”). 
39. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1939, 1947–48 (2011) (“If the Appointments Clause supplies a precise method of appointing 
‘Officers of the United States,’ the Court should not permit Congress to adopt a contrary 
approach under the more general authority it possesses under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.”); see also Will Baude, Who is Lawfully the Attorney General Right Now?, REASON: THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 10, 2018, 3:48 PM), https://reason.com/2018/11/10/who-is-
lawfully-the-attorney-general-rig/ (reasoning as a matter of text, “it should require a principal 
appointment . . . to occupy that office even for a day”). 
40. Neal K. Katyal & George T. Conway III, Trump’s Appointment of the Acting Attorney 
General Is Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2yZ1tyP; see also Walter 
Dellinger & Marty Lederman, Initial Reactions to OLC’s Opinion on the Whitaker Designation as 
“Acting” Attorney General, JUST SEC. (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/61483/initi
al-reactions-olc-opinion-whitaker-designation-acting-attorney-general/ (positing that agency-
specific statute should apply because acting Attorney General would be Senate-confirmed). 
41. 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017). 
42. Id. at 946 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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 I begin by documenting strategies used by Presidents and executive officials 
to work around Senate confirmation requirements.  These include the naming 
of acting officials, the use of internal delegations to relocate the powers of a 
Senate-confirmed office to an unconfirmed individual, and multiple individual 
claims to “exercise the authority” of Senate-confirmed roles that do not seem 
grounded in any clear grant of authority.  In the months immediately prior to 
the finalization of this Article for publication, executive agencies deployed even 
more strategies to bypass statutory constraints on acting officials.  The Interior 
Department (DOI) used a bootstrapping “succession” order, in which an 
acting official  designated himself as next in command.43  Meanwhile, at DHS, 
an individual claimed to act as Secretary of Homeland Security for the sole 
purpose of issuing a succession order eliminating this acting role and 
reinstating as acting Secretary an individual whose service had been declared 
illegal under the applicable statutory framework.44 
 This volume of executive machinations around statutory restrictions 
underscores the need for clearer constitutional guidance.  This Article 
accordingly turns to the Appointments Clause and analyzes the extent to 
which the Appointments Clause should constrain presidential reliance on 
unconfirmed officials in principal officer posts, including Cabinet secretaries 
and at least some officials within the thick layer just below.  Although not 
anticipated in the drafting of the Appointments Clause, the early history of 
the Republic reflects presidential reliance on such officials and Congress’s 
recognition of presidential need for acting officials, at least for stopgap 
purposes.  Meanwhile, Supreme Court doctrine has not directly addressed the 
question since 1898, when the Court, in United States v. Eaton,45 approved as 
constitutional an unconfirmed acting general consul’s service in Bangkok.46  
But the Eaton approach does not fully engage the relevant considerations or 
provide meaningful limitations upon presidential use of unconfirmed officials 
in Senate-confirmed offices. 
I argue that a formalist approach here cannot satisfactorily resolve the 
Appointments Clause question.  An appropriately thorough analysis of the 
 
43. See infra text accompanying note 162 (discussing Pendley succession order). 
44.  See infra text accompanying notes 169–170 (describing Gaynor succession order). 
45. 169 U.S. 331 (1898). 
46. Id.; see infra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing the NLRB v. SW General, Inc. 
case); see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 600 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring for four 
Justices) (stating in dicta, “Congress can authorize ‘acting’ officers to perform the duties 
associated with a temporarily vacant office—and has done that, in one form or another, since 
1792”).  But see id. at 541 (majority opinion) (stating in dicta, “[a]cting officers may have less 
authority than Presidential appointments . . . [and] would lessen the President’s ability to staff 
the Executive Branch with people of his own choosing . . . .”). 
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constitutional question must consider the Take Care and Vesting Clauses 
and, as implied by early vacancies statutes, approach these issues from a 
functional perspective.  The literature so far, inexplicably, does not contain 
such an analysis.  A functional perspective on acting officials is important to 
fully engage relevant concerns, including administrative function, Senate 
function, accountability, and democratic responsiveness.  Such a thorough 
assessment requires considering valid reasons for flexibility, together with the 
extent of substitute forms of accountability, if any, for the accountability 
expected from the Senate confirmation process.  The amount of power an 
official could exercise bears both on the need for a stopgap in the event of a 
vacancy and the importance of accountability for the choice of the official.  
Perhaps counterintuitively, a functional approach to this constitutional 
question is likely more constraining than other interpretive approaches. 
 A functional analysis of the Appointments Clause strongly suggests that 
current FVRA authorizations for principal officers are simply too long, and 
that courts should recognize their constitutional doubtfulness.  The wholesale 
delegation of the responsibilities of a vacant principal officer post to an 
unconfirmed official also raises constitutional difficulties.  In particular, the 
Appointments Clause should be interpreted to authorize the President to rely 
only briefly on acting officials for Cabinet-level principal officer roles. 
Instead, the President should be expected to promptly forward nominations 
to the Senate for advice and consent.47 
 A functional approach would also support appropriately calibrated 
legislative reforms.  As discussed in greater detail below, Congress should set 
shorter time limits on acting service and specify that Senate-confirmed 
deputy secretaries should be preferred to serve as acting secretaries. 
Parts I.A. and I.B. overview the problem of acting officials in principal 
officer positions and the statutory framework that governs it.  Part I.C. 
documents presidential strategies to work around confirmation, including 
exploiting ambiguities in statutes that authorize acting officers, delegating 
Senate-confirmed office responsibilities wholesale to other officials, and 
permitting individuals to simply assert the authority of these offices without 
being named “acting” or receiving a delegation of authority.  Part II 
addresses the constitutional issues.  It advocates a functional approach to the 
Appointments Clause as both more clarifying and more constraining than a 
formal approach.  In a functional analysis, at least some service by 
unconfirmed acting officials ought to be considered constitutionally tolerable 
to enable the President to carry out executive functions, but current statutes 
authorize unconstitutionally lengthy service by acting officials in principal 
 
47. This article leaves for another day the challenges raised by serious Senate 
confirmation delays or outright recalcitrance.  See infra text accompanying notes 366–367. 
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officer roles.  Part III concludes by considering implications and potential 
reforms.  Among other changes, Part III recommends that acting Cabinet-
level service be presumptively limited to thirty days and that below-Cabinet-
level service be limited to 120 days, extended during the period that a 
presidential nomination is pending in the Senate. 
I. WORKING AROUND CONFIRMATION 
A.  Presidential Reliance on Acting Officials 
 To achieve their policy priorities and expand their power, Presidents have 
increasingly focused on senior agency officials.  Presidents could centralize 
administrative policymaking through regulatory review or other means of 
ensuring that the final decision tracks the President’s priorities, but such 
centralizing takes considerable resources.48  Accordingly, presidential 
administrations have moved toward “politicizing” agencies as a means of 
policy control by “[p]opulat[ing] the bureaucracy with politically responsive 
actors.”49  Selecting individuals loyal to the President’s policy preferences (or 
to the President) may be a relatively efficient way of assuring that policies 
conform to the President’s priorities.50  The strategy also helps account for 
the “thickening” of the top layer of political officials at agencies over the past 
few decades.51  As Professor Terry Moe wrote, if they have freedom to do so, 
Presidents are likely to find politicization “irresistible,” since the power to 
select officials is simple, flexible, and incremental.52 
We should see presidential use of acting officials as part of this politicization.  
Political scientists have long assumed that Presidents prefer to promptly 
 
48. See Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 235, 240–45 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985) (explaining that political 
institutions, knowledge, and time all limit the President’s policymaking abilities); David J. 
Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1102–03 (2008) (discussing Moe’s theories). 
49. See Barron, supra note 48, at 1102; Moe, supra note 48, at 240–45 (emphasizing that 
Presidents can and are expected to make agency appointments that align with the Executive’s 
agenda). 
50. See Barron, supra note 48, at 1096 (noting “a thick cadre of political appointees” are 
chosen to govern agencies “either for having close ties to the President or for making strong 
prior commitments to his regulatory vision”). 
51. See id. (reasoning Presidents also make use of their appointments powers to “remake 
agencies in their own image”).  See generally LIGHT, supra note 24, at 8 (noting Presidents have 
the freedom to establish titles as they like, contributing to the thickening of government). 
52. Moe, supra note 48, at 245. 
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nominate individuals to fill vacancies in Senate-confirmed offices.53  Under 
that scenario, Presidents would rely on acting officials in Senate-confirmed 
roles only as stopgaps, pending a prompt nomination and confirmation 
process.54  But as Kinane has documented, Presidents may also use such 
vacancies more strategically.55  In deciding whom to formally nominate for a 
Senate-confirmed post, the President must consider whether the individual 
and her policy commitments are acceptable to a majority of Senators.56  Senate 
confirmation requests can also prompt contentious battles over agency policies 
and direction.  For example, the Senate used the 2018 confirmation hearing 
of Gina Haspel to lead the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to dig deeply 
into detainee torture under the CIA’s auspices. 57  Several Senators also sought 
Haspel’s assurances that she would not support a President who wished to 
“carry out some morally questionable behavior.”58 
The President might find an acting official appealing to avoid such 
confirmation battles and to empower someone whose policy commitments 
and loyalties more closely resemble the President’s (or her key supporters) 
than the Senate’s.59  The individual might support aggressively moving policy 
in the President’s preferred direction or, if the President prefers, contracting 
policy.60  Kinane found that Presidents tend to rely on acting officials in 
Senate-confirmed “high capacity” posts when Presidents prioritize policy 
expansion.61  She also found that Presidents tend to leave positions outright 
empty when policy contraction is prioritized, perhaps including when those 
positions are deemed “unnecessary.”62  As discussed below, despite Kinane’s 
findings, even if neither a Senate-confirmed nor an acting official occupies a 
 
53. Kinane, supra note 32, at 5 (positing that political science theories “assume that 
Presidents will always make appointments”). 
54. Presidential ability to use acting officials may be critical if the Senate is obstructionist.  
Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without a Senate 
Confirmation Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940, 942 (2013) (noting the prospect of such Senate behavior). 
55. Kinane, supra note 32, at 8–9 (overviewing presidential motivations). 
56. Id. at 5. 
57. Matthew Rosenberg et al., Gina Haspel Vows at Confirmation Hearing that She Would Not 
Allow Torture by C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2KNLhFc 
58.  Id. 
59. E.g., Everett & Johnson, supra note 32 (regarding selection of Cuccinelli as acting official). 
60. Kinane, supra note 32, at 30. 
61. Id. at 30–31 (“[W]hen presidents prioritize expansion, interim appointees in high 
capacity positions are over 30 percent more likely . . . as empty high capacity positions.”). 
62. See Kinane, supra note 32, at 39 (“[C]ontraction policy priorities do increase the 
number of empty high capacity positions.”) (emphasis added); Cody Derespina, Trump: No 
Plans to Fill ‘Unnecessary’ Appointed Positions, FOX NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.foxnews.co
m/politics/trump-no-plans-to-fill-unnecessary-appointed-positions. 
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post, someone else may be claiming to exercise the office’s authority.63  In 
short, a presidential strategy to politicize agencies—to bring agency 
leadership preferences closer to those of the President—might well include 
reliance on acting officers in preference to Senate-confirmed individuals. 
Reliance on acting officials in Senate-confirmed roles might also give a 
President freer rein to make patronage-related appointments or to select 
individuals unlikely to be confirmed.  For example, consider William Pendley 
who, until September 25, 2020, when a district court found it illegal, claimed 
to “exercise[e] the authority of the [d]irector” of the BLM from his post as 
Deputy Director for Policy and Programs.64  Pendley’s naming was 
controversial because he had publicly advocated for selling off all public 
lands.65  As a Reagan Administration official, Pendley had also been criticized 
for “serious errors in judgment” and a “suspicion of wrongdoing,” prompting 
a Justice Department referral for criminal prosecution, though no charges were 
ever filed.66  Probably in response to litigation challenging the legality of 
 
63. See infra notes 132–137 and accompanying text (discussing delegations of authority). 
64. See Bullock v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 4:20-cv-00062-BMM, 2020 WL 5746836, 
at *3 (D. Mont. Sept. 25, 2020) (describing Pendley’s claim to authority); infra text 
accompanying notes 162–166.  Secretary of the Interior, David Bernhardt, has indicated that 
he will exercise the power of the office rather than seeking the nomination of a new BLM 
Director.  Rebecca Beitsch, Interior Secretary Will Lead BLM After Judge Ousts Pendley from His 
Public Lands Role, HILL (Sept. 30, 2020, 12:35 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-
environment/518956-interior-sec-will-lead-blm-after-judge-ousts-pendley-from-public. 
65. Editorial, William Perry Pendley Did Not Have Senate Approval. Congress Should Not Stand for 
It., WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2019), https://beta.washingtonpost.com/opinions/william-perry-
pendley-can-do-a-lot-of-damage-in-a-short-period-of-time/2019/08/08/9fcf881e-ba08-
11e9-b3b4-2bb69e8c4e39_story.html (“Mr. Pendley’s promotion appears to be part of a 
broader effort to kneecap the agency.”). 
66. Pendley and an associate allegedly signaled to lessees that the Department of Interior 
(DOI) would accept very low bids for coal leases in the very large 1982 Powder River Basin 
coal lease sales, as well as accepted a pricey dinner from industry representatives.  Philip 
Shabecoff, Report Finds Interior Department Mismanaged Coal Lease Program, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 
1984, at A1; Philip Shabecoff, Coal Lease Disclosure to Industry is Reported, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
1984, at 8 [hereinafter Shabecoff, Coal Lease Disclosure] (noting Mr. Pendley was a dinner guest 
for Interior representatives the day DOI changed bidding procedures, effectively halving the 
amount necessary to bid on coal tracts); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/RCED-84-167, 
DEFICIENCIES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR OIG INVESTIGATION OF THE POWDER 
RIVER BASIN COAL LEASE SALE 19 (1984), https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/141702.pdf 
(noting that Russell and Pendley “attended a $494.45 dinner at a Washington D.C.[] 
restaurant” with “coal company representatives . . . representing [Texas Energy Services, Inc. 
(TESI)], a bidder at the April 1982 sale”); Shabecoff, Coal Lease Disclosure, supra (explaining 
Pendley “removed from responsibility for the department’s mineral programs after William 
P. Clark replaced Mr. Watt as Interior Secretary”).  See generally COMM’N ON FAIR MKT. 
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Pendley’s service, the President nominated Pendley to the post in June 2020.67  
The nomination, which seemed unlikely to succeed, was withdrawn shortly 
thereafter, in August 2020.68  Despite the lack of Senate receptiveness to his 
service—and a district court ruling in that matter, issued in September 2020, 
finding his claim to exercise the Director’s power illegal69—Pendley was still 
serving in the BLM as Deputy Director as of writing, in November 2020, and 
claiming that he was still in charge.70 
B.  Current Statutory Authorization for Acting Officials: The Federal Vacancies Reform 
Act of 1998 and Agency-Specific Statutes 
The 1998 FVRA, together with multiple agency-specific statutes, broadly 
authorizes service by unconfirmed acting officials in numerous Executive 
Branch positions made Senate-confirmed by statute, with the exception of 
members of certain commissions and Article I courts.71  The FVRA is keyed 
to positions that are Senate-confirmed by statute; it makes no distinction for 
principal officers for which Senate confirmation is constitutionally required. 
The FVRA provides for acting officials if the occupant of a Senate-
confirmed office “dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the 
 
VALUE POL’Y FOR FED. COAL LEASING, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 385, 415–16 (1984) 
(reporting Pendley “had developed, well in advance of the sale, an overriding policy objective 
to lease a substantial amount of coal reserves,” and that the Russell/Pendley restaurant 
incident was referred for criminal prosecution to the Justice Department). 
67. Scott Streater, Trump to Formally Nominate Pendley to Lead BLM, E&E NEWS (June 26, 
2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063459085/print. 
68. Steven Mufson, White House Withdraws Nomination of William Pendley to Head the Bureau of 
Land Management, WASH. POST. (Aug. 15, 2020, 3:35 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/cli
mate-environment/2020/08/15/white-house-withdraws-nomination-william-pendley-head-
bureau-land-management/ (describing the nomination as “controversial”); Friedman, supra note 
16 (noting that withdrawal of nomination was “tacit acknowledgment that [Pendley] could not 
win Senate confirmation”). 
69. See Bullock, 2020 WL 5746836, at *10–11 (finding Appointments Clause and Federal 
Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) violation and enjoining Pendley from claiming to exercise the 
authority of BLM Director). 
70. Rebecca Beitsch & Rachel Frazin, Overnight Energy: Pendley Says Court Decision Ousting 
Him from BLM Has Had ‘No Impact’, HILL (Oct. 8, 2020, 6:56 PM), 
https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/overnights/520300-overnight-energy-pe
ndley-says-court-decision-ousting-him (reporting Pendley’s statements that “I’m still here, 
I’m still running the bureau”); Friedman, supra note 16 (Interior Department responded to 
ruling by “[t]weak[ing Pendley’s] title”). 
71. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a) (covering “an officer of an Executive agency”); § 3349c (excluding 
Article I courts, multi-member independent commissions and government corporations, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Surface Transportation Board). 
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functions and duties of the office.”72  The statute defaults to the “first 
assistant” of the office, whether or not Senate-confirmed, who is to perform 
the functions in an “acting capacity.”73  The statute further grants the 
“President (and only the President)” the authority to select an alternative 
acting official, other than the first assistant, from those already serving in a 
Senate-confirmed office or those who have served in the agency for more 
than ninety days at a rate of pay at least as high as GS-15.74 
The FVRA authorizes acting service by this individual for 210 days, even 
if the President does not submit a nomination to the Senate during that 
time.75  The period is extended to 300 days at the start of an Administration.76  
Once a nomination is submitted, the acting official may serve as long as the 
nomination is pending in the Senate and an additional 210 days after the 
date of rejection, withdrawal, or return.77  Even if the first nomination fails, 
the person may continue to serve as long as a second nomination is pending 
plus 210 days after the date of rejection, withdrawal, or return of that second 
nomination.78  These time limits significantly expanded ones set in previous 
statutes,79 and again, they apply equally to Cabinet-level roles and other 
Senate-confirmed roles with less authority. 
These FVRA provisions give the President substantial flexibility to rely on 
acting officials.  Permitted time periods are long and the qualifications 
requirements for acting officials are not terribly limiting.  Most agency statutes 
establishing a non-Senate-confirmed deputy or “first assistant” position 
require no particular qualifications for that role, and the President and her 
staff can influence who is chosen to serve.80  By the same token, the FVRA 
authorizes the President to select among the many individuals who have 
 
72. § 3345(a). 
73. § 3345(a)(1). 
74. § 3345(a)(2)–(3).  “The GS-15 pay grade is generally reserved for top-level 
positions, such as supervisors, high-level technical specialists, and top professionals holding 
advanced degrees.”  GS-15 Pay Scale—General Schedule 2020, FEDERALPAY.ORG, https://ww
w.federalpay.org/gs/2020/GS-15 (last visited Nov. 6, 2020).  With the exception of “first 
assistant[s]” who have served at least 90 days or who are themselves Senate-confirmed, 
these individuals may not serve as acting officials if they have been nominated for the 
position.  5 U.S.C. § 3345(b)(1)–(2). 
75. § 3346(a)(1). 
76. §§ 3346, 3349a(b). 
77. § 3346(a). 
78. § 3346(b). 
79. See infra text accompanying notes 229229–230 (discussing the duty and extent of 
power imposed by the Take Care Clause). 
80. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5) (imposing no qualifications for Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau Deputy Director apart from selection by Director). 
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served for at least ninety days at a GS-15 level or higher in the agency or 
among Senate-confirmed presidential appointees across the government.81 
The FVRA states that it is the exclusive means of addressing vacancies, 
except for agency-specific statutes that “expressly” designate an acting 
employee to serve “temporarily.”82  Despite some textual ambiguity, the 
FVRA is understood not to displace agency-specific statutes, such as the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) statute specifying that the 
“Deputy Director . . . shall serve” as acting Director,83 or the Justice 
 
81. The FVRA does not clearly permit an after-vacancy designation of a first assistant or 
address whether the President may designate an acting official to fill a vacancy caused by 
presidential firing.  See generally O’Connell, supra note 20, at 672–75 (discussing issue).  
Although the prospect may be unappealing in some circumstances, the President must be able 
to remove a poorly performing individual or one engaged in misconduct, particularly from an 
at-will post, without being prohibited from using FVRA authorities.  Such an individual is 
certainly “unable to perform” the duties of the office.  The contrary position, moreover, would 
put courts in the uncomfortable position of investigating presidential motivations in individual 
cases.  The FVRA’s own limitations, if adequately reformed, should be sufficient to limit 
potential presidential strategizing.  The appointment of Matthew Whitaker as acting Attorney 
General seemed to raise the issue of whether a President could fill a firing-created vacancy 
because Attorney General Sessions was perceived to have been pushed out.  See supra text 
accompanying note 3.  Kenneth Cuccinelli’s selection as acting head of the USCIS raised the 
issue of an after-vacancy designation of a first assistant who would then become the acting 
official.  See John Lewis et al., L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli: Trump’s Preference for Acting Officials Hits a 
Wall, LAWFARE (Apr. 23, 2020, 11:59 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lm-m-v-
cuccinelli-trumps-preference-acting-officials-hits-wall.  However, the district judge hearing a 
litigation challenge did not reach the issue.  See L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24–
26 (D.D.C. 2020) (finding Cuccinelli not to be an “assistant” on other grounds); Ben Miller-
Gootnick, Note, Boundaries of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 459, 461 
(2019) (arguing that the Vacancies Act “does not authorize the [P]resident to temporarily fill 
vacancies created by firing the prior officeholder”). 
82.  5 U.S.C. § 3347(a)(1)(A). 
83. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5) (deputy director to “serve as acting Director in the absence or 
unavailability of the Director”).  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) statute 
authorizes the Deputy Director to act in case of “absence or unavailability,” without mentioning 
the term “vacancy.”  Id.  Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) interpreted the statute 
to cover vacancies.  See Memorandum from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal 
Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to for Donald F. McGahn II, Couns. to the President 1 (Nov. 25, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2017/11/25/cfpb_a
cting_director_olc_op_0.pdf (finding that the Deputy Director’s ability to serve as acting 
Director “does not displace the President’s authority under the [FVRA]”).  These statutes’ 
designation of a particular officeholder to serve as an acting official could be considered 
legitimate qualifications requirements, but some suggest they represent Congress inappropriately 
“appointing” officeholders.  Joshua Stayn argues that such statutes encroach on presidential 
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Department’s statute stating that “Deputy Attorney General may exercise all 
the duties of [the Attorney General], and for the purposes of the [FVRA] is 
the first assistant . . . .”84  These statutes are often more limiting than the 
FVRA in identifying a particular individual who must act, often a Senate-
confirmed official. 
But the text does not clearly resolve whether the FVRA is entirely 
displaced by such statutes or retains some application.  The FVRA’s 
legislative history suggests Congress generally meant it to remain as an 
alternative.85  Perhaps emphasizing the point, the occasional statute expressly 
bars the FVRA’s application.86  To date, this issue generally has been 
assessed case-by-case, creating confusion.  In the case of the CFPB, two 
“acting” heads, Deputy Director Leandra English, so chosen by the outgoing 
CFPB Director and identified as “acting Director” by the CFPB statute, and 
Senate-confirmed Office and Management Budget (OMB) Director Mick 
Mulvaney, selected by the President to “act” under the FVRA, both 
appeared at the office the same day in November 2017.87  Litigation was 
required to resolve the conflict; a district court concluded that the FVRA 
could still apply, validating the President’s selection of Mulvaney.88 
 
prerogatives.  Joshua Stayn, Note, Vacant Reform: Why the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 Is 
Unconstitutional, 50 DUKE L.J. 1511, 1513, 1525, 1533 (2001). 
84. 28 U.S.C. § 508(a)–(b) (further designating the Associate Attorney General to act if 
the Deputy Attorney General is absent). 
85. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 15–17 (1998) (“Vacancies Act would continue to provide an 
alternative.”). 
86. For example, the DHS succession statute identifies the Deputy Secretary as the FVRA 
“first assistant,” see 6 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1)(A), so that the Deputy automatically steps into the acting 
role if necessary.  That statute further specifies, however, that “notwithstanding” the FVRA, if 
neither the “Secretary nor Deputy Secretary is available” the “Under Secretary for Management 
shall serve as the Acting Secretary,” and that “the Secretary may designate such other 
officers . . . [to serve] in further order of succession.”  § 113(g) (emphasis added).  It remains 
unclear, however, whether time limitations or other FVRA provisions might still apply. 
87.  Renae Merle, Dueling Officials Spend Chaotic Day Vying to Lead Federal Consumer Watchdog, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/two-
dueling-officials-spend-chaotic-day-vying-to-lead-federal-consumer-watchdog/2017/11/27/
381eada2-d39c-11e7-b62d-d9345ced896d_story.html. 
88. English v. Trump, 279 F. Supp. 3d 307, 319–26 (D.D.C. 2018).  Several 
commentators, including me, disagree with this interpretation.  E.g., Marty Lederman, Who’s 
the Acting Director of the CFPB? Understanding the Legal Dispute at the Center of the Kerfuffle, 
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 26, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/understanding-
legal-dispute-at-center.html (addressing the President’s authority under the 1998 Vacancies 
Reform Act); Nina Mendelson, More Thoughts on the CFPB Puzzle: President Trump Can Select 
Someone to Run the CFPB Only if the Senate Has an Opportunity to Confirm, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE 
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Similarly, for Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker, some argued 
that the agency-specific statute that expressly identified the Deputy Attorney 
General, at the time Rod Rosenstein, as the “first assistant” and acting 
Attorney General in case of vacancy, should be understood to displace 
FVRA provisions authorizing the President to select someone else.89  They 
emphasized that the Deputy Attorney General is Senate-confirmed, unlike 
Matthew Whitaker and some other FVRA-acceptable acting officials.90  On 
the other hand, the agency-specific statute’s reference to “first assistant” 
seems to contemplate continuing application of the FVRA.91 
Perhaps just as important, these statutes, like other agency-specific 
statutes, contain no time limitations on acting service, prompting controversy 
over whether the FVRA’s time limits continue to apply.92  The overall point 
 
& COMMENT (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/more-thoughts-on-the-cfpb-
puzzle-president-trump-can-select-someone-to-run-the-cfpb-only-if-the-senate-has-an-
opportunity-to-confirm-by-nina-a-mendelson/. 
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 508. 
90. Critics of Whitaker’s selection argued that the relevant statutes should be interpreted 
to permit only the Deputy Attorney General to serve to avoid the potential constitutional 
issues presented by an unconfirmed official serving in a principal officer role.  Dellinger & 
Lederman, supra note 40.  Language in the Committee Report accompanying the FVRA 
supports this reading.  S. REP. NO. 150-250, at 13 (1998) (“With respect to a vacancy in the 
office of Attorney General, 28 U.S.C. § 508 will remain applicable.  That section ensures that 
Senate confirmed Justice Department officials will be the only persons eligible to serve as 
Acting Attorney General.”).  But because the language addressed 28 U.S.C. § 508, which was 
enacted by a different Congress, courts would typically accord it little, if any, interpretive 
weight regarding the intention of that Congress.  See Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977) (reasoning that views of enacting Congress, not later 
Congress, deserve weight in interpretation).  Earlier versions of the vacancies statutes had 
expressly excepted the Attorney General post from the President’s authorization to select 
individuals other than the first assistant, but the FVRA removed this limitation.  Compare Act 
of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 3347, 80 Stat. 378, 426 (enacting 5 U.S.C. § 3347 and 
stating, “[t]his section does not apply to a vacancy in the Office of the Attorney General”), 
with Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
105-277, § 151, 122 Stat. 2681, 2681-613 (1998) (rewriting presidential discretion provisions 
of 5 U.S.C. § 3347 and omitting exception for Attorney General). 
91. 28 U.S.C. § 508(a). 
92. It could be argued that the agency-specific statutes with no time limitation are 
displaced altogether by the FVRA’s exclusivity clause, since the only exception to FVRA 
exclusivity is for undisturbed agency-specific statutes that authorize “an . . . employee to 
[act] . . . temporarily in an acting capacity.”  5 U.S.C. § 3347(a)(1)–(2).  Agency-specific 
statutes with no time limits arguably do not qualify as temporary authorizations.  
Nonetheless, legislative history lists forty agency-specific statutes meant to survive, among 
them the Justice Department succession statute, 28 U.S.C. § 508, which, with no express 
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is that statutory instructions are often conflicting,  unclear, or unbounded, 
leaving greater scope for argument and underscoring the importance of 
clearer constitutional guidance both to Congress and the courts. 
C. Presidential Workarounds 
The FVRA imposes only loose limits on acting officials, since it broadly 
authorizes reliance upon unconfirmed individuals and permits lengthy terms 
of service.  Nonetheless, perhaps due to the limits the FVRA does impose, 
together with potential controversy, disapproval, or delays in the Senate 
confirmation process, presidential administrations have gone outside the 
FVRA and deployed other methods of putting individuals in power without 
Senate confirmation.93  
1.  Historic - Recess Appointments 
Although the Supreme Court has now restricted this technique, it 
deserves mention as an important confirmation workaround strategy.  The 
Recess Appointments Clause, again, gives the President the power to “fill 
up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate.”94  The 
Clause has enabled Presidents not only to fill positions but to appoint 
individuals the Senate might not have been willing to confirm.95  President 
Barack Obama made thirty-two recess appointments to full-time positions; 
President George W. Bush made ninety-nine recess appointments to full-
time positions; President Bill Clinton made ninety-five recess appointments 
to full-time positions.96 
 
time limitation on “acting,” might not be understood as a “temporar[y]” authorization.  See 
S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 15–17 (1998).  Further, even if agency-specific statutes designating 
a particular acting official displace the FVRA’s more general provisions regarding who can 
serve as an acting official, a court might find that the FVRA’s time limitations nonetheless 
continue to apply.  But see, e.g., Casa de Maryland, Inc. v. Wolf, No. 8:20-cv-02118-PX, 
2020 WL 5500165, at *18–20 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 2020) (finding plaintiffs were unlikely to 
succeed in establishing that FVRA’s 210-day time limit applied to acting Secretary of 
Homeland Security). 
93. See Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 
DUKE L.J. 1607, 1610 (2015) (arguing that political polarization prompts “political 
innovation”). 
94. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
95. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1489 (2005) (discussing the alternative means the President may take to 
bypass Senate resistance). 
96. HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42329, RECESS APPOINTMENTS MADE BY 
PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA 3 (2017), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R4232
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In some cases, these were because of untoward delays in the Senate; in 
others, they seemed to be an effort to appoint an individual notwithstanding 
likely Senate opposition during the confirmation process.  For example, 
President Clinton famously recess-appointed Bill Lann Lee as Assistant 
Attorney General for Civil Rights in 2000 when it was clear the Senate would 
not act to confirm him.97  The Senate responded to such tactics by holding pro 
forma sessions to avoid the creation of a “recess.”98  In 2012, President Obama 
made four controversial recess appointments, including naming the first 
director of the CFPB, Richard Cordray, following a Senate filibuster of that 
appointment, together with three members of the NLRB.99  The Supreme 
Court ultimately curtailed presidential reliance on recess appointments in 
NLRB v. Noel Canning.100  It interpreted the Recess Appointments power to be 
available only for Senate recesses of “substantial length,” presumptively not 
less than ten days.101  This ruling enables the Senate to easily block recess 
appointments by the President, as the Senate reportedly did during the August 
2017 recess by holding pro forma sessions every three business days.102 
  2.  Exploiting Statutory Ambiguities and Ignoring Limits 
Administrations can, of course, rely heavily on acting officials.  Consider the 
EPA Office of Water in the Obama Administration.  There, an acting official 
 
9.  Obama’s recess appointments were all individuals with formal nominations pending in the 
Senate.  Id. at 7.  In twenty of the thirty-two cases, the Senate later confirmed the nominee; the 
other nominations were either returned to or withdrawn by the President.  Id. at 8. 
97. See Alex Keto, Clinton Announces Recess Appointments, Naming Bill Lann Lee to Civil Rights 
Post, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2000, 12:32 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB965347307843
74825; Sonya Ross, Clinton Appoints Lee to Civil Rights Job, ABC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2006, 6:02 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=123227&page=1 (quoting Senator Patrick Leahy 
(D-Vt) stating that nominees “especially women and minorities, have been subject to 
anonymous and humiliating delays”). 
98. Metzger, supra note 93, at 1609. 
99. E.g., David Nakamura & Felicia Sonmez, Obama Appoints Richard Cordray to Head 
Consumer Watchdog Bureau, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/polit
ics/richard-cordray-appointed-by-obama-to-head-consumer-watchdog-bureau/2012/01/04
/gIQAGyqraP_story.html. 
100. 573 U.S. 513 (2014). 
101. Id. at 527.  A majority held that the Recess Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 2, cl. 3, includes both inter-session recesses and intra-session recesses of substantial length 
and that “a recess of more than 3 days but less than 10 days is presumptively too short to fall 
within the Clause.”  Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 538. 
102. Jordain Carney, Senate Blocks Trump from Making Recess Appointments over Break, HILL 
(Aug. 3, 2017, 7:40 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/345261-senate-blocks-
trump-from-making-recess-appointments-over-break. 
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served for years as the acting Assistant Administrator for Water while the 
nomination of Kenneth Kopocis was repeatedly submitted to the Senate 
without action.  The acting official, Nancy Stoner, eventually departed, leaving 
the office vacant.  It is unclear whether the Senate was generally recalcitrant, 
perhaps had signaled its unwillingness to confirm Kopocis or any nominee for 
the office, whether the Obama Administration preferred Stoner to an 
individual whom the Senate could be expected to confirm, or whether 
President Obama was simply lax in not making another nomination.103 
Sometimes no nomination has been submitted at all—and none appears 
to be forthcoming.  For example, three agencies located within the DOI—
the BLM, the National Park Service (NPS), and the Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS)—were run by unconfirmed officials for a significant period of time 
beginning in January 2017; no Assistant Secretary was even nominated to 
head any of the agencies until mid-2019, roughly two and a half years into 
the Trump Administration.104  Then-DOI Secretary Ryan Zinke 
commented casually to the press in May 2018 that he did not expect any 
nominees prior to 2019 for any of these positions.105  Instead, these agencies 
were headed by individuals serving as acting officials and others, as discussed 
below, who claimed to be “exercising the power” of the relevant Senate-
confirmed post.  In February 2019, The Washington Post reported that “vast 
swaths of the government have top positions serving in an acting capacity,” 
noting particularly in the DOI “eight handpicked deputies” serving without 
confirmation.106  As of November 17, 2020, no individual had been 
confirmed to lead the BLM, the NPS, or the Office of Surface Mining 
Reclamation and Enforcement.107 
 
103. See Nina A. Mendelson, The Uncertain Effects of Senate Confirmation Delays in the Agencies, 
64 DUKE L.J. 1571, 1588–89, n.78 (2015). 
104. Partnership/Post Appointee Tracker, supra note 5.  Robert Wallace, Assistant 
Secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, was not nominated until May 2019, and not confirmed 
until July 2019.  See id. 
105. See Jennifer Yachnin, 3 Top Jobs Will Stay Vacant Until Next Year—Zinke, E&E NEWS 
(May 10, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2018/05/10/stories/1060081409 (“‘It 
is unlikely as a secretary that I will have a director of the Park Service, a director of BLM, and 
a director of the Fish and Wildlife Service by two years in.’”). 
106. Eilperin et al., supra note 14. 
107. The Administration’s nomination of Aurelia Skipwith for Fish and Wildlife Service 
Director, in October 2018, was returned; she was renominated in July 2019, and finally 
confirmed in December 2019.  See Partnership/Post Appointee Tracker, supra note 5.  An initial 
nomination for the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement was withdrawn in 
2018; Lanny Erdos was nominated in October 2019.  See id.  As of late June 2020, Pendley was 
nominated to direct the BLM, but his nomination was withdrawn in August 2020.  See supra notes 
67–68 and accompanying text. 
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At DHS, as of November 17, 2020, an acting Secretary leads the agency; 
no Senate-confirmed individual has occupied the post for well over 500 days, 
since April, 2019.108  The Deputy Secretary position also has been vacant for 
over 900 days, since April 2018, with no nomination pending.109  DHS’s 
website initially described the position as “vacant,” but named David Pekoske 
as “Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary.”110  (As of 
March 1, 2020, Kenneth Cuccinelli became that “Senior Official Performing 
the Duties of the Deputy Secretary” and continues to claim that title as of 
November 7, 2020.)111  Pekoske acted in this capacity, including designating 
acceptable identity documents for certain individuals who wish to live and 
work in the United States.  Pekoske signed these rules with the title “Senior 
Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary.”112 
At the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), as of writing, 
November 17 2020, no individual has been nominated to serve as Director 
since the Senate-confirmed Director L. Francis Cissna resigned on June 1, 
2019; the post has been vacant for over 500 days.113  Ken Cuccinelli claims to 
serve as “Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director, U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services.”114  In this capacity, he has issued 
numerous policies, including cutting the time asylum seekers have to consult 
with their attorneys prior to the crucial “credible-fear interview.”115  Cuccinelli 
continues to claim this authority despite the March 2020 district court ruling 
that Cuccinelli’s service violates the Federal Vacancies Reform Act.116 
 
 
108. See Partnership/Post Appointee Tracker, supra note 5.  Chad Wolf’s nomination was 
referred to the relevant Senate committee in September 2020.  Id. 
109. See id. 
110. See Leadership, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/leadership (last 
published Nov. 4, 2020).  
111. See id. 
112. Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by 
Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 84 Fed. Reg. 46,423, 46,426 (Sept. 4, 2019); 
Designation of REAL ID Identity Documents for Citizens of the Freely Associated States, 84 
Fed. Reg. 46,556, 46,557 (Sept. 4, 2019). 
113. See Partnership/Post Appointee Tracker, supra note 5. 
114. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 110.  Cuccinelli is still listed as serving in 
this capacity despite a district court ruling declaring Cuccinelli’s service illegal under the 
FVRA.  See L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24–29 (D.D.C. 2020). 
115. See L.M.-M., 442 F. Supp. 3d at 11–13 (detailing three “significant change[s] in 
policy” made by Cuccinelli pursuant to this claim of authority).  
116. Id. at 24–26 (finding Cuccinelli not to qualify in any of the authorized FVRA 
“acting” official categories and setting agency directives aside); see also Friedman, supra note 16 
(Cuccinelli “remain[s]”). 
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At the SSA, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Nancy Berryhill, 
served as acting Commissioner, but long overstayed the FVRA time limits.  
She nonetheless continued to take actions as acting Commissioner until a 
GAO Report officially found an FVRA violation in March 2018.117  As 
discussed in greater detail below, however, she continued to claim to exercise 
the functions of the Commissioner, though she no longer used the title acting 
Commissioner.118 
Similarly, even after a finding by the GAO that her service was in violation of 
the FVRA,119 a biography of the “acting” Inspector General at the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Helen Albert, continued to appear 
on HUD’s website, describing her title as “Acting Inspector General.”120 
Administrations have hired “first assistants” after a vacancy has occurred 
and then moved them into acting positions, despite the FVRA’s apparent plan 
to fill acting posts with experienced individuals.  This was the strategy used at 
USCIS.  After the post of Director became vacant, Kenneth Cuccinelli was 
hired in a newly created position, “Principal Deputy Director,” seemingly to 
vault him ahead of the Deputy Director, who might otherwise have been 
considered the “first assistant.”121  Cuccinelli was then named acting 
Director.122  In this case, the “first assistant” position was both created and 
filled after the vacancy arose.123  Addressing a matter of first impression, the 
federal court that declared Cuccinelli’s service illegal ruled that Cuccinelli had 
never served as an assistant and, thus, could not be a first assistant for purposes 
of the FVRA, and set aside two directives issued by Cuccinelli.124 
 
117. Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, Gen. Couns., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., 
to the President of the U.S. 1 (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690502.pdf. 
118. See infra text accompanying notes 156–158. 
119. See Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong to the President of the U.S., supra note 117, at 1. 
120. About the Inspector General, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV. (Nov. 19, 2018), 
https://www.hudoig.gov/about/about-the-inspector-general [https://web.archive.org/web
/20181119184019/www.hudoig.gov/about/about-the-inspector-general].  The Senate finally 
confirmed Rae Oliver as Inspector General on January 2, 2019, following a June 22, 2018 
nomination.  Partnership/Post Appointee Tracker, supra note 5. 
121. See Ted Hesson, Cuccinelli Starts As Acting Immigration Official Despite GOP Opposition, 
POLITICO (June 10, 2019, 12:38 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/10/cuccine
lli-acting-uscis-director-1520304; 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1) (“first assistant”). 
122. Press Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Cuccinelli Named Acting 
Director of USCIS (June 10, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/cuccinelli-
named-acting-director-of-uscis. 
123. Some alleged similar strategic conduct at the CFPB, when Richard Cordray named 
Leandra English Deputy Director—making her eligible to be acting Director under the 
agency-specific statute—just prior to stepping down from his post.  Merle, supra note 87. 
124. L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24–29 (D.D.C. 2020). 
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Finally, administrations have also sought to exploit ambiguity in the way 
the FVRA is read together with agency-specific statutes.  For example, at the 
CFPB, in November 2017, President Trump appointed OMB Director Mick 
Mulvaney to serve as acting CFPB Director, despite a reasonable argument 
that the statute establishing the agency, the Dodd-Frank Act, specifically 
required the Deputy Director to serve as acting Director,125 thus prevailing 
over the more flexible and general FVRA.126 
3. Delegating Authorities Elsewhere 
Most statutes that grant agencies authority delegate that authority to the 
Secretary or the Administrator.  In turn, organic statutes are generally 
express in authorizing the head of the agency to redelegate statutory 
authorities within the agency.127  Even without express statutory language, 
an agency head is typically assumed to be able to delegate powers in view of 
the impossibility of performing all tasks herself.128  Prior to the FVRA’s 
enactment in 1998, the Justice Department had long argued that an agency 
head with the power to delegate could simply delegate a vacant office’s 
functions to a named individual without needing to seek Senate confirmation 
or complying further with Vacancies Act requirements.129 
Both during that period and since, two sorts of delegation strategies have 
been deployed to relocate the powers of a particular office.  One might be 
 
125. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5). 
126. See Mendelson, supra note 88. 
127. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 513–14 (1974) (finding it 
unexceptionable that general language does not preclude delegation); Fleming v. Mohawk 
Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 121 (1947) (finding that rulemaking authority should 
be understood to authorize, rather than to restrict, subdelegation); Kobach v. U.S. Election 
Assistance Comm’n, 772 F.3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting agreement among federal 
courts of appeals). 
128. See Nathan D. Grundstein, Subdelegation of Administrative Authority, 13 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 144, 148 (1945) (arguing that necessity justifies implied power to subdelegate).  See 
generally Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (2017) (articulating 
positive theory of delegation); Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
859, 885–86 (2009) (discussing self-regulation to control delegations). 
129. See Acting Officers, 6 Op. O.L.C. 119, 121 (1982) (suggesting that “practical and 
political” concerns are main obstacles to delegating); MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., 98-892, THE NEW VACANCIES ACT: CONGRESS ACTS TO PROTECT THE SENATE’S 
CONFIRMATION PREROGATIVE 4 (1998); S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 3 (1998) (discussing Justice 
Department’s arguments that delegation authority supersedes Vacancies Act restrictions); see 
also George F. Will, Time to Evict Bill Lann Lee, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 1998) https://www.was
hingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1998/03/26/time-to-evict-bill-lann-lee/f4b663a8-c958
-45e2-98b0-fe105ffe0899/. 
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termed a vertical, or “supervised” delegation.  For example, President Clinton 
selected several officials with uncertain Senate confirmation prospects to serve 
as “acting” senior officials inside the Justice Department.130  Attorney General 
Janet Reno delegated authorities to them, invoking the Justice Department’s 
organic statute, which authorizes the Attorney General to “make 
provisions . . . authorizing the performance by any . . . employee . . . of any 
function of the Attorney General.”131  These individuals also used the title 
“acting.”  These included Dawn Johnsen, who acted as head of the OLC; 
Walter Dellinger, who acted as Solicitor General; and Bill Lann Lee, who 
acted as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights.132  Presumably, the 
Attorney General could supervise and revoke any of these delegations.133 
The other sort might be termed an “unsupervised” horizontal delegation.  
For example, on his way out the door, Clinton Administration Office of 
Thrift Supervision Director Timothy Ryan delegated all the office’s powers 
to Deputy Director Jonathan Fiechter.134  Fiechter exercised the powers for 
four years even though Ryan was no longer present to supervise or revoke 
the delegation.135  Even under a statute authorizing delegations, this strategy 
is dubious.  It effectively eliminates the “Director” position altogether and, 
despite the common-sense understanding of delegation, leaves no one in 
place to supervise or revoke the delegation. 
Congress had attempted to restrict this strategy in earlier law (the 1988 
Vacancies Act), but the Justice Department argued that the text of that 
statute did not accomplish the goal, and the accompanying legislative history 
 
130. See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
131. 28 U.S.C. § 510; see also S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 15 (stating that bill meant to 
foreclose the Justice Department’s argument that delegation power supersedes Vacancies Act 
restrictions); infra text accompanying notes 141–144. 
132. E.g., Brannon P. Denning, Article II, the Vacancies Act and the Appointment of “Acting” 
Executive Branch Officials, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1039, 1052–55 (1998) (discussing acting Assistant 
Attorney General Bill Lann Lee and acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger).  The term 
“acting” continues to be used for these positions.  E.g., Solicitor General: Walter E. Dellinger III, 
DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/osg/bio/walter-e-dellinger-iii (last updated Oct. 31, 
2014) (describing him as “Solicitor General (Acting for the term)”). 
133. Some statutes delegate authority directly to the President, which the President 
nearly always re-delegates to an agency head; presumably, the President also could seek to 
delegate to someone below the rank of agency head.  See generally Nina Mendelson, Another 
Word on the President’s Statutory Authority over Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2462 
(2011) (discussing Presidential Subdelegation Act of 1950). 
134. See generally Doolin v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 205, 208 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998). 
135. Id. 
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could not affect the statute’s interpretation.136  According to the 
Congressional Research Service, as of 1998, of sixty-four acting officials in 
executive departments, forty-three of them had served beyond the statutorily 
specified time limit, likely owing to reliance on the delegation strategy.137 
In 1998, responding to the Clinton Administration actions and the Justice 
Department position, Congress tried again to stamp out the delegation 
strategy.138  The FVRA states that it is the “exclusive means for temporarily 
authorizing an acting official” except for the so-called “agency-specific” 
exception, a statutory provision that “expressly” authorizes the President, a 
court, or the head of an executive department to designate an officer or 
employee “temporarily in an acting capacity.”139  The Act then explicitly 
clarifies that a statute providing “general authority . . . to delegate duties 
statutorily vested in that agency head . . . or to reassign duties . . . is not 
[such] a provision.”140 
Legislative history confirms Congress’s aim to limit delegation as a 
means of bypassing Senate confirmation.  The Senate Report 
accompanying the Senate bill in the 105th Congress, which contained the 
identical language appearing in the enacted FVRA, stated, “[s]tatutes that 
generally permit agency heads to delegate or reassign duties within their 
agencies are specified not to constitute statutes that provide for the 
temporary filling of particular offices.”141  Legislative context, including the 
Clinton Justice Department examples, also suggests that a central 
congressional goal was to eliminate agency use of internal delegation to 
avoid Vacancies Act limits on acting appointments.  The Senate Report 
specifically alluded to the Justice Department’s position that the power to 
delegate “supersedes the Vacancies Act’s restrictions” and characterized it 
as “wholly lacking in logic, history, or language,”142 further stating that the 
bar on using delegation strategies “forecloses the argument . . . that [Justice 
Department and other agency organic statute delegation provisions] 
rather than the Vacancies Act, apply.”143  The Report also suggested that 
 
 
136. The Vacancies Act, 22 Op. O.L.C. 44, 46–48 (1998). 
137. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 268 (2003). 
138. ROSENBERG, supra note 129, at 1; see also S. REP. No. 105-250 at 3–4 (1998) 
(describing Justice Department position). 
139. 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a)(1)(A). 
140. § 3347(b). 
141. S. REP. No. 105-250, at 2. 
142. Id. at 3. 
143. Id. at 17. 
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the Justice Department had informally conceded that the bill would 
foreclose the delegation strategy.144 
As I have discussed in greater detail elsewhere, the wholesale delegation of 
a Senate-confirmed office’s responsibilities violates the text of FVRA, and 
Congress aimed to end these practices when it enacted the statute.145  
Nonetheless, administrations have continued to invoke the delegation strategy, 
effectively creating a cadre of shadow acting officials.  Administrations have 
delegated power to people who would be ineligible to “act” under the FVRA’s 
qualifications requirements, time limitations, or both.  During the George W. 
Bush Administration, the deputy head of the OLC, Steven Bradbury, received 
power through a delegation around the vacant Assistant Attorney General 
position to sign opinions and supervise the office.146  During the Obama 
Administration, the unconfirmed career deputy director of the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Thomas Brandon, also exercised the 
Director’s power pursuant to a claim of delegated authority.147  
The Trump Administration also has relied heavily on delegations.  
Secretary Betsy DeVos signed delegations repeatedly assigning the 
authorities of the Senate-confirmed post of Assistant Secretary for 
Communications and Outreach (vacant since inauguration) to a named 
special assistant, Nathan Bailey, through mid-November 2018.148  Bailey was 
 
144. Id. at 10. 
145. See Nina A. Mendelson, L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli and the Illegality of Delegating Around 
Vacant Senate-Confirmed Offices, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/l-m-m-v-cuccinelli-and-the-illegality-of-delegating-around-
vacant-senate-confirmed-offices-by-nina-a-mendelson/; see also Bullock v. U.S. Bureau of 
Land Mgmt., 4:20-cv-00062-BMM, 2020 WL 5746836, at *9 (D. Mont. Sept. 25, 2020) 
(describing use of delegations to effectively designate William Pendley as acting BLM Director 
as “wordplay” that was still illegal). 
146. Letter from Gary L. Kepplinger, Gen. Couns., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., to 
Richard J. Durbin, U.S. Sen., Russell D. Feingold, U.S. Sen., and Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. 
Sen. 5 (June 13, 2008), https://www.gao.gov/assets/390/383258.pdf (reasoning that the 
Assistant Attorney General’s regulatory functions were “not sufficiently prescriptive for us to 
conclude that they assign non-delegable duties”).  The Senate had repeatedly returned 
Bradbury’s nomination without action.  Id. at 2. 
147. See BOB BAUER & JACK GOLDSMITH, AFTER TRUMP: RECONSTRUCTING THE 
PRESIDENCY 318–19 (2020) (ebook) (stating that delegation strategy was used to avoid a 
potentially difficult confirmation hearing). 
148. See Memorandum from Betsy Devos, Sec’y of Educ., to Nathan Bailey, Special 
Assistant, Off. of Commc’ns. & Outreach (June 5, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/office
s/list/om/docs/delegations/ea-eo-15.doc; Memorandum from Betsy Devos, Sec’y of Educ., 
to Nathan Bailey, Personal Delegation of Authority (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www2.ed.gov/abo
ut/offices/list/om/docs/delegations/ea-eo-16.doc. 
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not formally named acting Assistant Secretary—and could not have been 
under the FVRA—but was described as such at the time he transitioned to 
Chief of Staff.149  For another example, from January 2017 to May 2020, the 
Secretary of the Interior issued no fewer than thirty-three separate versions 
of Order 3345, delegating the powers of “vacant non-career [p]residentially 
appointed and Senate-confirmed positions for which there is no Principal 
Deputy that would automatically become acting” to other individuals. 150  
The January 2, 2020 version (earlier lists have been longer), for example, 
includes the Directors of the NPS, BLM, Office of Surface Mining, and 
Special Trustee for American Indians, among others; it delegates “all 
functions, duties, and responsibilities” of each position to a named 
individual.151  At the FWS, Susan Combs, then-Senior Advisor to the 
Secretary and the recipient of a similar delegation at the time, signed Federal 
Register notices this way: “Exercising the Authority of the Assistant Secretary 
for Fish and Wildlife and Parks.”152  Numerous Federal Register notices of 
both proposed and final rules have been signed by individuals “exercising 
authority of” a Senate-confirmed position, including rules delisting the 
grizzly bear as an endangered species and suspending implementation of 
rules aimed at reducing natural gas venting, flaring, and leaking from gas 
production activities on federal lands.153  In June 2020, the expired May 2020 
 
149. Monica Levitan, Betsy DeVos Appoints New Chief of Staff, DIVERSE (Oct. 26, 2018), 
https://diverseeducation.com/article/130426/ (describing Bailey as “acting Secretary of 
Communications and Outreach”). 
150. See DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3345 AMENDMENT NO. 32, TEMPORARY 
REDELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR CERTAIN VACANT NON-CAREER SENATE-CONFIRMED 
POSITIONS (2020), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/elips/documents/so-3345-
amend-32-signed-05.05.2020-508.pdf. 
151.  DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3345 AMENDMENT NO. 30, TEMPORARY 
REDELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR CERTAIN VACANT NON-CAREER SENATE-CONFIRMED 
POSITIONS (2020), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/elips/documents/so-3345-a30-
508_0.pdf (delegating all functions of positions). 
152. Migratory Bird Permits; Regulations for Managing Resident Canada Goose 
Populations, 83 Fed. Reg. 17,987, 17,992 (proposed Apr. 25, 2018) (proposing rule on 
management of resident Canada geese). 
153. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Review of 2017 Final Rule, 
Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem Grizzly Bears, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,737, 18,743 (regulatory 
reviewing determination) (reaffirming delisting and signed by Jim Kurth, “Exercising the 
Authority of the Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service”); Endangered and Threatened 
Wildlife and Plants; Reinstatement of ESA Listing for the Grizzly Bear in the Greater 
Yellowstone Ecosystem in Compliance With Court Order, 84 Fed. Reg. 37,144, 37,145 (July 
31, 2019) (Apr. 30, 2018) (to be codified 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (implementing final rule and signed 
by Margaret Everson, “exercising the authority of the Director for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
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secretarial delegation document was replaced with a combination of 
additional delegation orders and designation of successors memoranda 
issued by others, though the authority is unclear for at least some of these 
documents, as discussed in greater detail below.154 
4. Mystery Assertions of Authority 
In the Trump Administration, echoing Secretary of State Al Haig’s 
famous “I am in control here” declaration following the assassination 
attempt on President Ronald Reagan,155 officials have asserted they are 
“exercising the authority of” the Senate-confirmed office, though without 
using the title “acting.” 
At the SSA, once Nancy Berryhill stopped (illegally) claiming the title Acting 
Commissioner, she still signed Federal Register notices this way: “Nancy 
Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, performing the duties and 
functions not reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security.”156  Although 
the language resembles that sometimes used with delegated authority, research 
has located no delegation or any other legal authority supporting this 
appointment.157  Berryhill signed Federal Register notices in this way until 
 
Service”); Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; 
Delay and Suspension of Certain Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,050, 58,072 (Dec. 8, 2017) 
(to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160, 3170) (implementing final rule and signed by Katharine 
MacGregor, Deputy Assistant Secretary, “Exercising the Authority of the Assistant 
Secretary—Land and Minerals Management”). 
154. See DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3381, TEMPORARY REDELEGATION OF 
AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE (2020), https://www.doi.gov/sites/
doi.gov/files/elips/documents/so-3381-temp-del-dir-nps-508-compliant.pdf (delegating authority 
of National Park Service Director to Counselor to Secretary); infra note 163 and accompanying 
text (discussing “designation of successors” memoranda issued by Pendley and Vela).  See generally 
Rebecca Beitsch & Rachel Frazin, Interior Move Keeping Controversial Acting Leaders in Office Faces Legal 
Scrutiny, HILL (June 9, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/5017
35-interior-move-keeping-controversial-acting-leaders-in-office-faces. 
155. Following the assassination attempt on Ronald Reagan, and notwithstanding a 
living Vice President, Secretary of State Al Haig stated, “As of now, I am in control, here, in 
the White House.”  Richard V. Allen, When Reagan Was Shot, Who Was ‘In Control’ at the White 
House?, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/when-
reagan-was-shot-who-was-in-control-at-the-white-
house/2011/03/23/AFJlrfYB_story.html?utm_term=.ac46ec45f146. 
156. Extension of Expiration Dates for Two Body System Listings, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,862, 
13,863 (Apr. 2, 2018). 
157. 42 U.S.C. § 902(b)(4) designates the Deputy Commissioner of Social Security to act 
for the Commissioner in the event of “absence or disability,” but the FVRA time limitation 
had run and Berryhill did not use the title “acting Commissioner.” 
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April 2018, when the President nominated a new Social Security 
Administrator, Andrew Saul,158 enabling Berryhill to resume using the title 
Acting Commissioner while Saul’s nomination was pending in the Senate. 
Since October 2019, a similar claim has been made for the Deputy 
Secretary of Homeland Security’s powers.  David Pekoske, head of the 
Transportation Security Administration, signed Federal Register notices as 
“Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary.”159  He 
could not claim the title “Acting Deputy Secretary” of Homeland Security, 
since that position has been vacant since April 15, 2018,160 far longer than 
the FVRA permits for an acting official.  Research has located no publicly 
accessible delegation that authorized Pekoske to serve in this role.  Since 
March 2020, and as of November 17, 2020, Kenneth Cuccinelli has claimed 
to be “Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary.”161  
Meanwhile, from June 2020 through September 2020, William Perry 
Pendley continued to claim to “exercis[e] the authority of the [Bureau of Land 
Management] [D]irector,” pursuant to a so-called succession order signed by 
Pendley himself, as recounted in the opinion of a district court finding 
Pendley’s service illegal.162  This bootstrapping succession order claims to be 
issued pursuant to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, though the FVRA 
contains no authorization for the creation of either delegations or succession 
orders.163  In response to the district court ruling, Pendley’s bio page on the 
 
158. During the pendency of Saul’s nomination, Berryhill resumed using the title Acting 
Commissioner, presumably relying upon the FVRA.  Saul was finally confirmed in June 2019.  
Partnership/Post Appointee Tracker, supra note 5. 
159. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
160. See Elaine C. Duke, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/archive/perso
n/elaine-c-duke (last published Apr. 11, 2017) (noting end of Deputy Secretary Duke’s tenure). 
161. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 110 (describing position in text). 
162. See Bullock v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mmgt., 4:20-cv-00062-BMM, 2020 WL 
5746836, at *2 (D. Mont. Sept. 25, 2020). 
163. See Memorandum from William Perry Pendley, Deputy Dir. of Pol’y & Programs, U.S. 
Bureau of Land Mgmt. to Casey Hammond, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Land & 
Mins. Mgmt., U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt. (May 22, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2
020/08/19/document_gw_03.pdf (designating successors for presidentially-appointed, Senate-
confirmed positions); 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349 (containing no authority to issue succession or 
delegation orders).  A similar bootstrapping succession order was prepared by Raymond Vela, 
National Park Service (NPS) Deputy Director, Operations, who is claiming to exercise the power 
of the NPS Director.  See Memorandum of Raymond Vela, Deputy Dir. of Operations, Nat’l 
Park Serv. to Assistant Sec’y for Fish & Wildlife & Parks (June 4, 2020) (designating Deputy 
Director, Operations, as “First Assistant” to the National Park Service and “delegat[ing] the 
authority to perform all duties of the Director when required . . .”) (on file with the Administrative 
Law Review); see also Beitsch & Frazin, supra note 154. 
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DOI website as of November 7, 2020, describes him merely as Deputy 
Director, Policy and Programs.164  Despite reports that Secretary of the 
Interior Bernhardt would exercise the power of the office rather than seeking 
the nomination of a new BLM Director, a response authorized by the 
FVRA,165  Pendley has continued to make public statements indicating that he 
is “still here, still running the bureau.”166  As of November 17, 2020, despite 
the district court order specifically ruling this basis for service illegal, Pendley’s 
official biography still claims that his “Official Roles and Responsibilities” 
include the “Authority of the Director, BLM, as delegated.”167 
At DHS, following the GAO Opinion and the federal court ruling that 
Chad Wolf had not been designated as acting Secretary of Homeland 
Security under a properly issued succession order,168 yet another approach 
was deployed.  Peter Gaynor, the Senate-confirmed Director of the Federal 
Emergency Management Authority (FEMA), who had been designated in an 
earlier succession order to serve as acting Secretary of Homeland Security, if 
needed, but who appears never to have been named in that role, reportedly 
signed a new succession order.169  That succession order disclaimed Gaynor’s 
authority to act as Secretary and instead designated Wolf as acting Secretary 
of Homeland Security.170  Wolf’s nomination to Secretary was forwarded to 
the relevant Senate committee the same day (triggering, under the FVRA, 
authorization of further service by an appropriate acting official beyond the 
210-day time limit).171  Wolf then issued a document entitled “Ratification,” 
 
164. See William Perry Pendley, U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/bio
/william-perry-pendley (last visited Nov. 13, 2020).   
165. See 5 U.S.C. § 3348(b)(2) (allowing exercise of authority by the head of the agency); 
Beitsch, supra note 64 (reporting Bernhardt statement that he will exercise power of BLM). 
166.  Beitsch & Frazin, supra note 70 (reporting Pendley’s statements that “I’m still here, 
I’m still running the bureau”). 
167. See Official Roles and Responsibilities, U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., 
https://www.blm.gov/basic/official-roles-and-responsibilities (last visited Nov. 13, 2020); 
Bullock v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 4:20-cv-00062-BMM, 2020 WL 5746836, at *9 (D. 
Mont. Sept. 25, 2020) (holding that use of delegation to effectively designate William Pendley 
as acting BLM Director as “wordplay” that was still illegal). 
168. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing Casa de Maryland litigation and 
GAO ruling). 
169. See Chad F. Wolf, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/person/ch
ad-f-wolf (last published May 18, 2020) (listing Chad Wolf as serving continuously as Acting 
Secretary of Homeland Security since November 2019). 
170. See Adam Mazmanian, Acting DHS Head Offers Alternate Succession Path, FCW (Sept. 21, 
2020), https://fcw.com/articles/2020/09/21/dhs-succession-gaynor-memo-alternate.aspx. 
171. Partnership/Post Appointee Tracker, supra note 5 (noting that the nomination was 
forwarded on September 10, 2020); 5 U.S.C.§ 3345. 
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purporting to ratify all of his actions taken during his period of illegal service 
as acting Secretary.172 
Some of these claims of authority rest on foundations that are shaky at 
best; others may be pursuant to internal, though difficult to discover, 
delegations or other documents, potentially violating the FVRA.  Some, such 
as the SSA case, may represent an unsupervised delegation (what I am calling 
“horizontal” delegation) or may not be pursuant to any delegation or other 
valid claim of authority.173  Without a delegation, the legal basis for these 
claims of authority is unclear at best. 
As a formal matter, the examples described above fall within the 
“contested zones of authority between the President and Congress.”174  In 
recent years, however, despite press coverage of reliance on acting officials 
and delegation around Senate-confirmed officials, there does not seem to be 
much of a contest.  Instead, the Senate has been largely quiescent.  During 
the Trump Administration, as of November 7, 2020, the GAO had made 
FVRA violation findings in only six cases: the Inspector General of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA),175 the Commissioner for the SSA,176 the 
General Counsel for the Air Force,177 the Inspector General for HUD;178 and 
the Inspector General for the Export-Import Bank.179  In August 2020, the 
 
172. Ratification of Department Actions, 85 Fed. Reg. 59,651 (Sept. 23, 2020) (claiming 
to “resolv[e] any potential defect in the validity of those actions” issued by Wolf during 
previous period of illegal service). 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 156–158 (discussing Social Security 
Administration case). 
174. Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., Transcending Formalism and Functionalism in Separation-of-Powers 
Analysis: Reframing the Appointments Power After Noel Canning, 64 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1518 (2015). 
175. Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, Gen. Couns., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., to 
the President of the U.S. 1 (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/700915.pdf 
(reporting violation of FVRA time limits by Inspector General at the Tennessee Valley Authority). 
176. Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong to the President of the U.S., supra note 117 
(reporting continuing violation of FVRA time limits by acting Commissioner of the Social 
Security Administration). 
177. Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, Gen. Couns., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., 
to the President of the U.S. 1 (May 9, 2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/692014.pdf 
(reporting violation from November 2017 to January 2018, though a Senate-confirmed official 
took the position of General Counsel for the Department of the Air Force in February 2018). 
178. Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, Gen. Couns., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., 
to the President of the U.S. 1 (May 9, 2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/692255.pdf 
(reporting continuing violation of FVRA time limits by Inspector General for the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development). 
179. Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, Gen. Couns., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., 
to the President of the U.S. 1 (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/704433.pdf 
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GAO found that neither the acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Chad 
Wolf, nor acting Deputy Secretary Kenneth Cuccinelli, had been named 
legally.180  Notwithstanding the GAO findings, the “acting” Commissioner 
for the SSA stayed on.  She continued to sign Federal Register notices in her 
own name.181  The HUD Inspector General similarly stayed on, as did the 
TVA Inspector General, albeit using other titles.182  So has the acting 
Secretary of Homeland Security, following the “complicated legal 
maneuver” previously described,183 as well as the acting Deputy Secretary, 
despite the lack of any clear claim to authority on his part.184  Relatively few 
lawsuits have challenged these appointments as violating either the FVRA or 
the Appointments Clause.185  Of course, neither Senate quiescence nor the 
 
(reporting continuing violation of FVRA time limits by Inspector General for the Export-
Import Bank of the United States).  
180. DHS Decision, supra note 9, at 1 (finding that the acting officials had been “named by 
reference to an invalid order of succession”). 
181. See supra text accompanying notes 156–158. 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 119–120 (Department of Housing and Urban 
Development IG); Message from the Deputy Inspector General Performing the Duties of Inspector General Jill 
Matthews, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., https://oig.tva.gov/deputyigmatthews.html (last visited Nov. 
13, 2020) (using the title “Deputy Inspector General Performing the Duties of Inspector General”). 
183. See Tanvi Misra, Wolf to Face Heated Senate Confirmation Hearing for Homeland Security 
Job, ROLL CALL (Sept. 22, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/09/22/wolf-to-
face-heated-senate-hearing-for-homeland-security-job/ (quoting American Immigration 
Council policy analyst Aaron Reichlin-Melnick); supra text accompanying notes 169169–170 
(discussing maneuvers in more detail). 
184. The GAO opinion made clear that the Deputy Secretary position was governed by 
the FVRA and that the 210-day limit had passed, though it acknowledged the possibility that 
the department could designate someone to perform delegable duties of the position.  It did 
not report any such delegations, however.  See DHS Decision, supra note 9, at 10–11 n.14.  
Research also has not uncovered any. 
185. In 2020, multiple lawsuits challenged the legality of Chad Wolf’s service as acting 
Secretary of DHS.  See supra note 10 (listing lawsuits).  Lawsuits were also filed challenging 
Cuccinelli’s ability to act as head of USCIS and Pendley’s ability to act as Director of the 
BLM.  See supra note 15.  Searching cases decided over the last five years on Westlaw has 
uncovered relatively few additional cases of this sort.  Beyond the challenges already described, 
the lawsuits mainly concerned the service of Lafe Solomon as acting National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) General Counsel in the Obama Administration and the selection of Matthew 
Whitaker as acting Attorney General in the Trump Administration.  E.g., NLRB v. SW Gen., 
137 S. Ct. 929, 937–38 (2017) (challenging service of acting NLRB General Counsel); Hooks 
ex rel. NLRB v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs., 816 F.3d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 2016) (same); 
Creative Vision Res., L.L.C. v. NLRB, 882 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2018); Guedes v. Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 356 F. Supp. 3d 109, 144–45 (D.D.C. 2019), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 789 (2020) (mem.) (challenging Whitaker appointment as acting Attorney 
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lack of judicial rulings can resolve the potential undermining of the 
Constitution’s structural safeguards against the abuse of power.186 
II. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE AND BYPASSING SENATE 
CONFIRMATION 
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution states that the President “shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of 
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall 
be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior 
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads 
of Departments.”187 
Until now, the specific limits upon acting service have mainly been 
delineated by statutes.  But the lack of serious statutory limits on acting 
officials and the development of even more strategies to bypass the 
confirmation process underscore the need for clearer constitutional 
guidance.  I now turn to those issues. 
As commentators have noted, reliance on acting officials to fill principal 
officer positions raises Appointments Clause concerns.  But for “inferior 
officers,” the acting officer problem is much less significant from a 
constitutional perspective.  In general, Congress may vest appointment of such 
officials in the President alone (or courts or heads of departments); that includes 
the power to make certain posts, although not others, Senate-confirmed.188 
While the Constitution clearly requires Senate confirmation for principal 
officers, we lack needed clarity on which executive officers are principal 
officers.  Cabinet officials and other heads of agencies who report directly to 
the President are indisputably principal officers.  Regarding below-Cabinet-
 
General); United States v. Patara, 365 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088–89 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (same); 
English v. Trump, 279 F. Supp. 3d 307, 311–12 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding little likelihood of 
success on challenge to Mulvaney appointment as acting CFPB director). 
186. E.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 571–72 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(stating, to protect the vitality of separation of powers, “[t]his Court does not defer to the other 
branches’ resolution of such controversies”); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 879 (1991). 
187. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
188. On the other hand, the FVRA’s specification of the First Assistant as the default 
“acting official,” 5 U.S.C. § 3345, subject to presidential choices of others, could prompt a 
challenge that Congress, rather than the President, has improperly selected the officer 
(assuming the acting official is an officer).  E.g., E. Garrett West, Note, Congressional Power over 
Office Creation, 128 YALE L.J. 166, 215 (2018).  But this portion of the statute also could be 
defended as a mere stopgap in the absence of affirmative presidential action and not a 
constraint on the President asserting her power to select the inferior officer. 
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level officials, the law remains uncertain—and there is considerable 
variability in individual circumstances.  In other work, I suggest there are 
strong arguments that many members of the “thick layer” of political 
appointees below the level of agency head may be principal officers, rather 
than inferior officers.189   
For now, it is fair to assume that, given their significant powers often 
specifically delegated by statute, many subcabinet agency heads, and some 
assistant and deputy secretaries above them on the organizational ladder, are 
principal officers.  These might include the head of the FEMA and the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) Commissioner.  The Constitution, as well 
as the statutes that created such posts, may require Senate confirmation even 
though these officers reside within an institutional structure headed by a 
principal officer who reports to the President. 
For these important lower-level posts, as well as for Cabinet-secretary-level 
posts, the Constitution’s text, including the Appointments, Take Care, and 
Vesting Clauses, does not speak directly to the permissibility of acting officials 
not confirmed for the role.  The implications of early history also are not clear-
cut, but they imply agreement to the need for at least some acting service. 
Particularly because it involves the administrative state, functional analysis 
provides a more logical frame for this question, and even for those who may 
tend toward more formalist constitutional interpretation, a functional 
approach can contribute usefully.  As discussed in greater detail below, in 
this setting functional analysis may be more constraining than other 
interpretive approaches.  In short, no matter how one views constitutional 
interpretation, there is important reason to consider a functional analysis. 
A. Current Appointments Clause Doctrine on Acting Officials: United States v. 
Eaton (1898) 
The constitutionality of unconfirmed acting officials in principal officer 
positions has been rarely litigated.  When it has, the primary judicial 
approach has been to characterize an acting official as an inferior officer even 
if the office’s normal occupant would be a principal officer.  In one very 
limited setting, that has been the Supreme Court’s answer.190  As discussed 




189. Nina Mendelson, Which Executive Branch Officials Are Principal Officers? (July 
2020) (unpublished draft) (on file with author). 
190. See Hilario v. United States, 218 F.3d 19, 24–25 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Eaton, 169 U.S. 331 (1898). 
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In 1898, the Court approved the congressional authorization and actual 
selection of a temporary acting “consul” in United States v. Eaton.191  The 
consul general himself temporarily assigned a missionary to serve as vice-
consul and to take charge of the American consulate in Bangkok, then-Siam, 
during the consul general’s leave of absence for illness, “perform[ing] 
whatever duties were required there of . . . a consul-general, with the 
knowledge of the Department of State and with that department’s approval,” 
until a properly commissioned vice consul arrived in Bangkok to take over.192  
The missionary later sued for his compensation.  The United States had not 
wished to pay the missionary the full consul general salary.  The Court 
upheld the salary claim, in the process finding the appointment 
constitutionally unproblematic.193 
The Court reasoned that the acting officer was not serving in a capacity akin 
to a principal officer, and thus concluded that presidential appointment and 
Senate confirmation were not required.194  “Because the subordinate officer is 
charged with the performance of the duty of the superior for a limited time 
and under special and temporary conditions, he is not thereby transformed 
into the superior and permanent official.”195  The Court did not specify 
whether it considered the acting officer to be an inferior officer or merely an 
employee,196 though in two later cases, it suggested that the officer in Eaton was 
an inferior officer.197  The Court has never repudiated Eaton, and even Justice 
 
191. Eaton, 169 U.S. at 352. 
192. Id. at 333. 
193. The Court explained that a statute authorized the President to provide for the 
appointment of vice consuls and interpreted the consular regulations, which were 
promulgated “with the approval of the President,” to provide for temporary appointments of 
the sort received by Eaton.  Id. at 337–343.  The Court reasoned that without a legitimate 
acting appointment, “the public interest must inevitably suffer in consequence of the closing 
of the consular office.”  Id. at 342. 
194. The ill consul selected Eaton apparently pursuant to duly promulgated State 
Department regulations, something that might not pass muster if Eaton had been deemed an 
“Officer” rather than an employee.  It is unclear whether State Department regulations could 
satisfy the Appointments Clause requirement that “Congress” vest appointment power, or 
whether the consul would be considered a “Head of Department.”  E.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. 
Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018) (finding Appointments Clause violation for Securities and Exchange 
Commission SEC Administrative Law Judges selected by internal staff; no apparent allegation 
of SEC rules violation for their selection). 
195. Eaton, 169 U.S. at 343. 
196. E.g., Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 
447–48 (2018) (discussing the difference between officers and employees). 
197. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997) (“Among the offices that we 
have found to be inferior are . . . a vice consul charged temporarily with the duties of the 
07. MENDELSON_FINAL_FORMATED (ARTICLE 1) (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2020  1:14 PM 
2020] MAY THE PRESIDENT WORK AROUND SENATE CONFIRMATION? 571 
Thomas, who argued, concurring in the Court’s 2017 decision in NLRB v. SW 
General, Inc.,198 that the Appointments Clause generally bars an unconfirmed 
acting official from long-term service in a principal officer position, 
distinguished Eaton but did not argue for Eaton’s abandonment.199 
In 2003, the Justice Department OLC followed Eaton in opining that the 
selection of a non-Senate-confirmed acting Director of OMB would be 
constitutional.200  Similarly, in 2018, OLC relied significantly on Eaton in 
opining that Justice Department Chief of Staff Matthew Whitaker could 
constitutionally serve as acting Attorney General.201 
Although characterizing an acting official in a principal officer role as 
“inferior” represents a path around the constitutional text requiring Senate 
advice and consent for principal officers, Eaton’s reasoning that the acting 
official is inferior because the appointment is “special and temporary” is 
otherwise unsatisfying.202 
First, although the existence of a time limitation in tenure could be 
understood as relevant on the theory that it limits the total quantity of 
decisions an acting official may undertake, it is not much of a distinction.  
Although formally limited, the FVRA-permitted periods of service are very 
long, with a starter period of 210 days, for example, often stretching much 
longer.203  The authorized period of service is on the same order of 
magnitude as the service of Senate-confirmed appointees; O’Connell has 
reported mean and median tenure rates for confirmed senior political 
appointees of well under three years.204  Thus, Eaton’s distinction of acting 
 
consul . . . .” (citing Eaton, 169 U.S. at 343)); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988) 
(characterizing Eaton’s holding that the vice consul was a “subordinate officer” as addressing 
whether a “particular Government official is a ‘principal’ or an ‘inferior’ officer”).  While 
characterizing an acting official as an “employee” would also obviate any constitutional 
problem, this is a dubious conclusion in view of the “significant authority” exercised by such 
individuals and their posting for more than occasional tasks.  See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051. 
198. 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017). 
199. Id. at 946 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring) (distinguishing Eaton from case at hand, while 
noting that acting official “exercised all of the statutory duties of that office” and served for 
“more than three years in an office limited by statute to a 4-year term”). 
200. Designation of Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 27 Op. 
O.L.C. 121, 123–24 (2003). 
201. Designating an Acting Att’y Gen., 42 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 1, 10, 19–21, 28 (Nov. 
14, 2018) [hereinafter Designating Acting Atty’ Gen.], https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/111225
1/download.  
202. Eaton, 169 U.S. at 343. 
203. See supra text accompanying notes 75–78. 
204. O’Connell has reported that the “average tenure for cabinet and executive agency 
appointees” in the George W. Bush and Clinton Administrations was 2.5 years.  O’CONNELL, 
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officials from Senate-confirmed officials based simply on whether the service 
is somehow “temporary” has not held up well over time. 
Further, the extent of supervision by Senate-confirmed officials, as well as 
the magnitude of duties, has long been understood as central to whether an 
officer is a “principal” officer.205  But an acting official serving in a Senate-
confirmed office occupies the same place in the organizational structure as 
the duly Senate-confirmed official, is subject to no greater formal supervision, 
and typically can exercise the full powers of the office during their time of 
service.206  Indeed, as implemented, that has been the whole point of having 
an acting official.  According to press coverage, CFPB Acting Director 
Mulvaney, for example, ended several high-profile enforcement actions and 
apparently tried to change the agency’s direction to reduce enforcement 
overall during his period of service.207  Many of these decisions will be 
difficult, if not impossible, for a new director to reverse. 
Similarly, there is little argument that Matthew Whitaker, if legally 
appointed, possessed the full powers of the Attorney General to shape Justice 
Department enforcement actions, to authorize Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act warrants, to resolve pending litigation, and to supervise 
independent counsel investigations.208  To underscore the point, the statute 
defining the line of succession to the President expressly excludes acting 
Cabinet secretaries,209 but other statutory limitations on the powers of acting 
 
supra note 30, at 919, n.23.  The GAO reported a median appointee tenure of 2.1 years from 
1981 to 1991.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/GGD-94-115FS, POLITICAL 
APPOINTEES: TURNOVER RATES IN EXECUTIVE SCHEDULING POSITIONS REQUIRING SENATE 
CONFIRMATION 2 (1994), https://www.gao.gov/assets/90/89690.pdf. 
205. E.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988) (holding that independent 
counsel was inferior officer given limited scope of power); Hilario v. United States, 218 F.3d 
19, 25 (1st Cir. 2000) (concluding that U.S. Attorneys were inferior officers in view of extensive 
supervision by Attorney General). 
206. But see infra text accompanying notes 285–288 (discussing ways in which acting 
officers may have reduced status). 
207. E.g., Paul Kiel, Newly Defanged, Top Consumer Protection Agency Drops Investigation of High-
Cost Lender, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 23, 2018, 6:12 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/con
sumer-financial-protection-bureau-drops-investigation-of-high-cost-lender; Caroline Basile, 
Leaked Mulvaney Memo: CFPB Must End Regulation by Enforcement, HOUSINGWIRE (Jan. 23, 2018, 
6:42 PM), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/42357-mulvaney-memo-cfpb-to-end-
regulation-by-enforcement. 
208. 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act warrants); Reply in Support 
of Motion to Substitute at 8–10, Michaels v. Sessions, 139 S. Ct. 936 (2018) (No. 18-496). 
209. 3 U.S.C. § 19(e) (stating that statutory line of succession “shall apply only to officers 
appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”). 
07. MENDELSON_FINAL_FORMATED (ARTICLE 1) (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2020  1:14 PM 
2020] MAY THE PRESIDENT WORK AROUND SENATE CONFIRMATION? 573 
officials appear extraordinarily rare.210  In general, an acting official is 
traditionally understood to possess the full powers of the office for the 
duration of the appointment.211 
In short, the Eaton Court’s apparent focus on the impermanent nature of an 
acting official’s service obscures other meaningful issues, including the type and 
importance of powers exercised, the extent of supervision, and the necessity of 
filling the vacancy pending the arrival of a Senate-confirmed officer. 
Consider, in particular, Eaton’s relatively unusual facts—a consular 
vacancy in a far-flung land which, in the late 1800s, might have taken weeks 
or months for an individual to reach from the United States, even once 
confirmed.  It also could be that consular powers in Bangkok at that time 
were, on balance, not all that significant.  Rather than focusing on the 
characteristics of the appointment, Eaton’s holding might be better 
understood—and better justified—as simply recognizing the need for some 
limited flexibility, under exigent circumstances, for unconfirmed acting 
individuals.  As discussed in greater detail below, however, the need for 
flexibility should be understood to shrink over time.  The need for flexibility 
in exigent circumstances was perhaps recognized in the opinion’s vague 
characterization of the acting appointment as not only temporary, but under 
“special . . . conditions.”212 
The only other potential Supreme Court guidance—albeit limited, and 
not in the context of acting officials—was in the Court’s 1994 decision in 
 
210. I used Westlaw to search the U.S. Code Unannotated database for statutes 
excluding acting officials using language similar to 3 U.S.C. § 19(e), which excludes 
unconfirmed individuals from statutory succession.  The query I used was “only” /s “advice 
and consent.”  The search yielded 17 statutes.  I reviewed all the statutes and located only two 
qualifying statutes: 3 U.S.C. § 19(e) and, arguably, a provision limiting the Defense Secretary’s 
ability to designate the principal advisor on military cyberforce matters to an official 
“appointed to the position in which such official serves by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate.”  10 U.S.C. § 2224I(1).  That provision could exclude both unconfirmed acting 
officers and officers in positions not requiring confirmation at all.  Of course, statutes 
restricting acting officials from exercising certain functions could be phrased differently. 
211. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a) (acting officials can “perform the functions and duties of the 
vacant office”).  This is consistent with historic practice.  See Acting Officers, 6 Op. O.L.C 
119, 120 (1982) (“An acting officer is vested with the full authority of the officer for whom he 
acts[]”); e.g., Keyser v. Hitz, 133 U.S. 138, 145–46 (1890) (same for deputy comptroller of the 
currency); Ryan v. United States, 136 U.S. 68, 81 (1890) (same for “[a]cting [s]ecretary of 
[w]ar”).  See generally O’CONNELL, supra note 17, at 4 (“Acting officials generally have the same 
authority as confirmed leaders.”). 
212. See United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898) (noting that the acting official 
served under “special and temporary conditions”). 
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Weiss v. United States.213  The Court approved congressional authorization for 
certain of the “hundreds or perhaps thousands” of Senate-confirmed military 
officers to be posted among the “indefinite number of military judges” 
without another round of presidential nomination and Senate confirmation, 
reasoning that the authorization did not seek to “circumvent[] the 
Appointments Clause by unilaterally appointing an incumbent to a new and 
distinct office” and that the new responsibilities were “germane” to the 
original appointment to which the individual had been confirmed by the 
Senate.214  Although it raises the specter of authorizations that might seek to 
“circumvent” the Appointments Clause, Weiss offers relatively little guidance 
regarding the acting officer question, especially for principal officers.  So far, 
no claims have been made that deputy secretaries, even if Senate-confirmed, 
can, without another round of confirmation, serve as Cabinet-level 
secretaries, perhaps in recognition that Cabinet secretary confirmation 
hearings may be more extensive and thorough.215  Instead, such individuals 
have used the “acting” title.216 
B. Other Constitutional Clauses 
As should be obvious from Eaton, the Constitution does not speak directly 
to the permissibility of an unconfirmed acting official serving in a Senate-
confirmed position. 
On the narrowest of readings, some might argue that the Appointments 
Clause implicitly bars any service by an individual not confirmed for the role 
in a principal officer position, because the Appointments Clause text lists no 
specific exceptions to the confirmation requirement for principal officers.217  
On an expressio unius theory, some might suggest that the Recess 
Appointments Clause, a supplement to the Appointments Clause’s means of 
appointing officers, confirms there are no further exceptions to the usual 
Senate confirmation process for principal officers.218 
 
213. 510 U.S. 163 (1994).  The Weiss Court discussed Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 
282, 300–01 (1893), in which the Court had approved the selection of two already Senate-
confirmed officers to a commission to supervise Rock Creek Park in the District of Columbia, 
reasoning that Congress could “increase the power and duties” of an office without requiring 
the incumbent to again be nominated and confirmed.  Weiss, 510 U.S. at 173–74. 
214. Id. at 174–76. 
215. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 364 (regarding Shanahan hearing). 
216. Cf. Dellinger & Lederman, supra note 40 (arguing only that Deputy Attorney 
General Rosenstein should “act” as Attorney General). 
217.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
218. E.g., Manning, supra note 39, at 1947.  West has hybridized this argument with 
arguments that acting officials might be considered inferior officers by suggesting that, by 
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But even on a textual reading, other text might imply greater latitude or 
at least some ambiguity regarding whether or when an acting official is an 
“officer” or “principal officer.”  The Constitution defines neither term.219  
The Eaton Court’s opinion exploited this in 1898 by suggesting that an acting 
official in a principal officer role might not be a principal officer at all.220  
Principal “Officers” presumably are the usual occupants of an “Office,” as 
implied by the Opinions Clause’s authorization of the President’s obtaining 
an Opinion of “the principal Officer . . . upon any Subject relating to the 
Duties of their respective Offices.”221  But the Necessary and Proper Clause 
references powers vested in any “Department or Officer,” perhaps implying 
that not every individual exercising the powers of a “Department” is 
necessarily an “Officer.”222 
Moreover, although such a reading certainly would be logical, the text also 
is not specific that a “Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust” 
(Emoluments Clause)223 is necessarily identical to the Appointments Clause’s 
“Officer.”  An acting official possibly might be a “Person holding [an] 
Office” or a person exercising the powers of a “Department” for a time 
without becoming an “Officer.”224  Conceivably, the courts could recognize 
another category of “Person” in government, as the Supreme Court has with 
the category of “employee,” a term not appearing in the Constitution.225 
One also might focus on the tension, or even conflict in some instances, 
between the narrowest reading of the Appointments Clause and other 
constitutional clauses.  Consider the obvious management challenge of a 
Secretary of Defense’s death in wartime, a Treasury Secretary’s serious 
misconduct in office, or a newly arrived President facing resignations by the 
 
“structural analogy,” “Congress may not promulgate a statute that allows an acting officer to 
serve longer than she otherwise could under the Recess Appointments Clause.”  West, supra 
note 189, at 210, 217 (suggesting that nearly two years might be acceptable). 
219. E.g., Mascott, supra note 196, at 450 (relying on corpus linguistics analysis to argue 
the original public meaning of “officer” extends broadly to “encompass any individual who 
had ongoing responsibility for a governmental duty,” including recordkeeping). 
220. See supra text accompanying notes 191–196 (discussing Eaton). 
221. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (implying that an Officer always holds an Office). 
222. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“Necessary and Proper” clause, referencing powers vested “in 
any Department or Officer”) (emphasis added); see also Mascott, supra note 196, at 450 
(suggesting that deputies “acting as agents in place of an officer” might under some 
circumstances not themselves be officers). 
223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
224. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; id. art. I, § 9 cl. 8. 
225. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976) (per curiam) (“‘Officers of the 
United States’ does not include all employees . . . [e]mployees are lesser functionaries 
subordinate to officers.”). 
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previous Cabinet position holders.  The narrowest interpretation of the 
Appointments Clause could require that these posts be left vacant pending 
confirmation of a new nominee.  But vacancies—particularly unanticipated 
ones—in very senior offices could undermine government function.226  Some 
authority for short-term coverage of Executive Branch vacancies seems 
consistent as well with the Take Care Clause, which requires the President 
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” and with the Vesting 
Clause, which vests “executive Power” in the President. 227 
The extent of presidential powers implied, or obligations imposed, by the 
Take Care Clause is contested, including whether it imposes a duty on the 
President228 or whether it implies powers beyond those expressly mentioned, 
such as the ability to deploy extra-statutory means to carry out statutes,229 or 
to disregard or decline to enforce statutes on constitutional or other 
grounds.230  Professors Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib, and Jed Shugarman have 
recently argued, based on historical and other evidence, that the Clause 
imposes a fiduciary-like obligation upon the President to carry out federal 
 
226. Cf. Krotoszynski, supra note 174, at 1522 (arguing that Senate confirmation delays 
burden the powers implied by the Take Care Clause). 
227. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President.”); id. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”).  The 
Opinions Clause—“he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each 
of the executive Departments”—also implies the regular presence of high-level officials, 
though the reference to “the principal Officer,” the term used by the Appointments Clause, 
also suggests the covered individuals are to be Senate-confirmed.  See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
228. See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on Marbury 
v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
253, 275 (2003) (“[I]n its essence, this clause is a duty conferred.”); David M. Driesen, Toward 
a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 83–84 (2009) (arguing that “the 
text strongly supports the duty-based theory”). 
229. See Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2019) (arguing that executive power includes only “the narrow 
but potent authority to carry out projects defined by a prior exercise of the legislative power”).  
Jack Goldsmith and John Manning argue that the Clause implies what they term a “completion 
power,” a power to “prescribe extra-statutory means when necessary to execute a statute.”  See 
Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 
1838, 1851 (2016) (discussing extra-statutory presidential power to protect judges with 
bodyguards); Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 
2280, 2302–03 (2006); see also Stephenson, supra note 5454, at 953 n.37 (discussing literature). 
230. E.g., Andrew Kent et al., Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 
2185 (2019) (arguing that “[n]onenforcement for policy reasons sits most at odds with the 
historical meaning of the Faithful Execution Clauses” [including the Take Care Clause]); 
David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-Enforcement Power, 63 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 61, 64; sources cited supra note 229. 
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statutes in a diligent and steady fashion.231  But under any view, the presence 
of high-level officials might be considered essential to the President’s ability 
to carry out executive functions, including under the Take Care Clause.232  
This is particularly so given the Executive Branch’s size and the wide range 
of its functions under current statutes.  As Attorney General John Young 
Mason commented in discussing the Recess Appointment Clause in 1846, 
“Offices without officers are useless to the public.”233 
Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause, which authorizes Congress to 
“make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government” might be interpreted to authorize 
Congress to pass statutes needed to assure the reasonable level of 
government function at which the other clauses are aimed, including 
authorizing limited service by unconfirmed officials, even in principal officer 
roles.234  At the least, Congress might authorize such service to support a 
reasonable opportunity to use the nomination as well as the advice and 
consent process laid out in the Appointments Clause.  An adequately 
constrained authorization of acting officials is arguably both critical to the 
executive function and something  different  from  the “ nominat[ion]  [of]  
 
 
231. Kent, supra note 230230, at 2190. 
232. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (finding both “selection” 
and “his power of removing those for whom he can not continue to be responsible” implied 
by Take Care Clause); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988) (considering whether 
limitation on independent counsel impermissibly interfered with “means for the President to 
ensure the ‘faithful execution’ of the laws”); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight 
Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010) (holding Take Care Clause implies that President must retain 
some removal authority over officers); Stephenson, supra note 54, at 953–54.  In English v. 
Trump, 279 F. Supp. 3d 307, 327 (D.D.C. 2018), the district court, concerned about Take 
Care Clause issues, deployed the constitutional avoidance canon to interpret the FVRA as 
an alternative to the CFPB succession statute to avoid a setting in which the President could 
neither select the acting official nor remove that individual at will.  That case, however, was 
highly specific to the CFPB, the structure of which was already facing constitutional 
challenge.  My point is not that the Take Care Clause necessarily entitles the President to 
broad choice among acting officials, but simply to ensure that some work can be done 
pending a prompt nomination and confirmation. 
233. Power of the President to Appoint to Office During Recess of Senate, 4 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 523, 525–26 (1846). 
234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Manning, supra note 39, at 1967 (arguing that, 
despite critique that some have overread implications of Necessary and Proper Clause, the 
clause does grant “some authority to structure the way the executive and judicial powers are 
‘carried into Execution’”). 
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Officers” to which the advice and consent requirements would otherwise 
apply.235 
My goal at this juncture is not to offer a definitive reading of constitutional 
text.  I simply note that undefined terms in the Appointments Clause, 
coupled by the issues raised by reading the Clause in a fuller constitutional 
context, leave significantly more space for unconfirmed acting officers than 
some have argued.  Moreover, as discussed in greater detail below, historical 
practice around acting officials also is in tension with the narrow reading of 
the Appointments Clause advocated by some. 
Eaton’s path through the text—denying under some circumstances that an 
acting official is a principal officer requiring Senate confirmation—could well 
be the best one from a purely textual perspective.  But Eaton’s approach is 
incomplete, and thus unconvincing, because it fails to provide adequate 
guidance on which circumstances should prompt us to conclude that acting 
official service is constitutionally permissible.236  In short, constitutional 
doctrine should go beyond Eaton to more thoroughly and directly engage 
functional and separation of powers considerations. 
I next turn to historical practice around acting officials.  I find that it is 
suggestive, but hardly dispositive, of the appropriateness of acting officials.  I 
then return to Eaton’s challenge by developing a functional approach to 
address how much flexibility the Constitution should be interpreted to afford 
the President to rely on unconfirmed individuals in principal officer posts. 
C. Historical Use of Acting Officials 
Constitutional drafters did not specifically address acting officers .  
From the very early years of the Republic, however, Congress authorized 
at least some acting service, and the President placed acting officials in 
principal officer positions.  Commentators have disagreed whether and 
under which conditions historical practice can serve as reliable evidence 
of a widespread or shared constitutional understanding237 or as a 
 
235. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
236. See supra text accompanying notes 191–199 (discussing Eaton v. United States). 
Similarly, although Judge Morris of the District of Montana declared, “[William] Pendley’s 
previous and ongoing service as Acting BLM Director violates the Appointments Clause,” he 
did not set forth any criteria for distinguishing constitutional acting service from 
unconstitutional acting service.  Bullock v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mmgt., 4:20-cv-00062-BMM, 
2020 WL 5746836, at *11 (D. Mont. Sept. 25, 2020). 
237. Compare William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 49 (2019) 
(suggesting that historical evidence may have value if interbranch constitutional deliberation and 
acquiescence amounts to “liquidation”), with Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 
HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 83 (2013) (critiquing approaches focused on congressional or presidential 
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“constitutional. . . precedent.”238  Whether practices around acting officials 
amount to any sort of constitutional precedent or not, they suggest at least 
some perceived need for acting officials over time and greater reliance on 
acting officials than the narrowest reading of the Appointments Clause would 
suggest. 
1. The Lack of Express Consideration 
The Federalist Papers make no mention of potential high-level vacancies 
while the Senate is in session.  For those who find them relevant,239 records 
from the 1787 Constitutional Convention also do not address the prospect of 
vacant high-level posts other than during a Senate recess.  Instead, the debate 
that resulted in the compromise of presidential nomination subject to Senate 
advice and consent was far more focused on how, precisely, to share 
appointments power between the President and the Legislature.240  Although 
acknowledging the value of permitting “one man of discernment” to select 
 
acquiescence by noting their neglect of potential judicial acquiescence to one or another branch), 
and Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 672–74 (2016) 
(expressing concern that acquiescence analysis generally will simply validate the action of the 
more active and powerful branch). 
238. E.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 418 (2012) (defending use of history and observing that “the 
Supreme Court, executive branch lawyers, and academic commentators have all endorsed 
the significance of such practice-based ‘gloss’”); Baude, supra note 237, at 59–60 
(“[R]epeated, sanctioned activity by public officials could create a form of constitutional 
precedent[]”); Stephenson, supra note 53, at 942; Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 714–18, 783–84 (2008).  But see LaCroix, supra note 237, at 77–78 
(“Historical practice is a slippery, unhelpfully capacious notion masquerading as 
a . . . neutral principle.”). 
239. As Matthew Stephenson summarizes, Convention debates were supposed to be secret; 
moreover, as “modern originalists emphasize, what matters is not original intent but original 
meaning or understanding.”  Stephenson, supra note 54, at 965 (emphasis omitted).  Further, the 
participants’ understanding presumably should matter less than that of the ratifiers.  Id. 
240. Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’ Understanding of “Advice and Consent”: A Historical 
and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 110–11 (2005) (describing focus of 
Convention discussion).  The Convention considered a number of options, including a 
stronger presidential role and sole Senate appointment, before settling on this compromise in 
September 1787, as discussed at length elsewhere.  See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 497–99 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S 
RECORDS] (recommendation of presidential nomination and Senate confirmation); id. at 599 
(Committee on Style’s revision with minor changes); JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND 
CONSENT OF THE SENATE 17–25 (1953); White, supra, at 111–14. 
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officials,241 the Senate advice and consent requirement, combined with that 
presidential nomination, was understood to counterbalance presidential 
power and to ensure a “judicious choice” of our most senior officials.242  As 
Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 76, Senate concurrence is 
meant to serve as an “excellent check upon a spirit of [presidential] 
favoritism,” tending to prevent the selection of unfit officers from “State 
prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view 
to popularity.”243  Senate confirmation could represent an opportunity for 
thorough and public deliberation on a nominee and, with presidential 
nomination, supply public accountability for the appointment. 
The Recess Appointments Clause, authorizing the President to “fill up all 
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate,”244 was added 
to the constitutional text in September 1787, without discussion or 
disagreement.245  Later statements during the founding era suggest that the 
recess appointment power was meant to serve as a “supplement” to 
appointment authority, as it might be “necessary for the public service to fill 
without delay,” in Hamilton’s words in Federalist No. 67.246 
Given the need for ensuring a “judicious choice” of officer—and the 
“necess[ity] for the public service to fill without delay,” as Hamilton 
commented regarding the Recess Appointments Clause, perhaps those 
considering the Appointments Clause ought to have anticipated deaths or 
misconduct among officials coupled with a less-than-instantaneous 
 
241. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 484 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano, ed., 2000). 
242. Id. 
243. Id.; see also Edmond v. United States¸ 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997) (Senate confirmation 
ensures that presidential appointment power is “not left unguarded” (citing 3 J. STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 376–77 (1833))). 
244. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
245. The motion, seconding, and vote all apparently took place on September 7, 1787.  
See FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 240240, at 533 (“It was moved and seconded to agree to 
the following clause . . . which passed in the affirmative[.]”); id. at 540 (motion of Mr. Spaight); 
id. at 600 (reporting language); HARRIS, supra note 240, at 24. 
246. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano, ed., 
2000).  At the North Carolina ratifying convention, Archibald Maclaine similarly suggested 
that the “‘public business may render it necessary.’”  Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments 
of Article III Judges: Three Constitutional Questions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 377, 380–81 (2005) 
(quoting 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 37, 102–103 (P. Kurland ed., 1787)).  
Contemporaries also suggested that recess appointment authority would obviate the need for 
the Senate to sit constantly.  See VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33009, RECESS 
APPOINTMENTS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2014) (quoting 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 537 (Merrill Jensen, ed. 1976)). 
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nomination and confirmation process.247  Nonetheless, not only was Senate 
delay or inaction, let alone presidential delays, apparently unanticipated 
during the Convention,248 but some even assumed that presidential 
nomination would essentially equate to appointment.249 
Not long after ratification, however, in his July 1789 letters to Roger 
Sherman, John Adams recognized the prospect of Senate delays.  He wrote, 
“The senate have not time . . . . [T]he whole business of this government will 
be infinitely delayed by this negative of the senate on treaties and 
appointments.”250 
2. Congressional Authorization of Acting Officials 
Likely in recognition of the practical difficulties Adams anticipated, 
Congress soon thereafter began authorizing acting officials.  President 
George Washington’s initial Cabinet appointments were confirmed 
smoothly, within a day or so.251  But by 1792, Congress had begun making 
arrangements for individuals to act in lieu of Senate-confirmed officers.  The 
Second Congress enacted legislation providing that “in case of the death, 
absence . . . or sickness” of the Secretaries of State, Treasury or the War 
Department, or of any officer in those departments, “it shall be lawful for the 
President . . . to authorize any person or persons at his discretion to perform 
the duties of the said respective offices until a successor be appointed, or until 
such absence or inability by sickness shall cease.”252 
In 1795, during the second Washington Administration, Congress 
broadened the coverage of the “acting” provision to apply “in case of 
[unspecified] vacancy” in those offices, in which case the President could 
authorize “any person . . . at his discretion, to perform the duties of their 
 
247. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 246. 
248. Stephenson, supra note 54, at 965–66 (“[T]he possibility of Senate 
inaction . . . seems not to have entered [Hamilton’s] mind . . . . Other influential members of 
the Founding generation [also seemed to] assume[] the Senate would take up all the 
President’s nominees.”) (emphasis omitted). 
249. See HARRIS, supra note 240240, at 18 (“They believed that the power to nominate was 
substantially equivalent to the power to appoint.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 241, at 
486 (“There can, in this view, be no difference between nominating and appointing.”).  But see 
Letter from John Adams to Roger Sherman (July 20, 1789), in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, 
SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 434 (Charles Francis Adams ed. 1851) (Senate 
“negative on appointments” will involve Senate in “reproach . . . without doing any good”). 
250. Letter from John Adams to Roger Sherman, supra note 249, at 435–36. 
251. STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 52 (1993). 
252. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 37, § 8, 1 Stat. 279, 281.  Research has not uncovered any 
relevant extant legislative history. 
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said respective offices.”253  Congress did, however, limit the duration: “[N]o 
one vacancy shall be supplied, in manner aforesaid, for a longer term than 
six months.”254  None of these statutes required acting officials to be Senate-
confirmed, and none of them articulated a justification for authorizing 
acting officials. 
Early sources also document service by individuals not Senate-confirmed 
for the particular position.  John Jay served as acting Secretary of State 
during Washington’s first term until Thomas Jefferson was confirmed in 
September 1789 and began his service in March 1790, for example.255  
Timothy Pickering, confirmed as Secretary of War, also served briefly ad 
interim as Secretary of State, on Aug. 20, 1795.256  And Charles 
Goldsborough, almost certainly not Senate-confirmed for any role and 
serving as Chief Clerk of the Navy, acted as Secretary of the Navy during the 
Madison Administration in 1809.257 
In November 2018, the Justice Department OLC, in an opinion aimed at 
validating the Whitaker appointment, asserted that there were “over 160 
times” pre-1860 appointments of non-Senate-confirmed acting officials to 
heads of Departments.258  Thomas Berry has, however, documented that the 
“significant majority” of the appointments identified by the OLC were “only 
acting heads [serving during travel or sickness], not ad interim” [serving 
following death or resignation].259  Berry elaborated further that periods of 
service, including for the ad interim appointments, generally were extremely 
short—on the order of days or weeks rather than months or years.260  Simple 
practical necessity may well have prompted these actions.261  Although they 
imply a level of acceptance of acting officials, neither the OLC nor the Berry 
 
253. Act of Feb. 13, 1795, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 415. 
254. Id. 
255. U.S. JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
CONGRESS, 1774–1961, H.R. Doc. No. 86-442, at 13 (1961). 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 14. 
258. Designating Acting Att’y Gen., supra note 201201, at 1–2 (“Mr. Whitaker’s designation 
is no more constitutionally problematic than countless similar presidential orders dating back 
over 200 years.”). 
259. See Thomas Berry, Is Matthew Whitaker’s Appointment Constitutional? An Examination of 
the Early Vacancies Acts, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 26, 2018), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/is-matthew-whitakers-appointment-constitutional-an-examination-
of-the-early-vacancies-acts-by-thomas-berry/. 
260. Id. (“[P]residents seemed hesitant to [appoint non-Senate-confirmed individuals as 
ad interim officials] if the vacancy was expected to last for a significant length of time.”). 
261. Cf. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 540 (2014) (citing Attorney General Wirt 
on the need for a president to obtain “assistance of subordinate officers”). 
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analysis yields a clear inference on what has been deemed acceptable, 
documents the justifications that might have been offered for these acting 
appointments, or discusses whether constitutional issues were confronted at 
the time. 
Congress has, since 1868, provided more generally for the filling of 
vacancies. 262  The statutory limit on acting service was ten days until 1891, 
then thirty days, and then, the dramatically longer 120 days (plus the length 
of time a nomination is pending) in 1988.263  All this culminated in the 
current, extraordinarily liberal FVRA regime, authorizing acting service for 
a period of 210 days to start.  To emphasize, the FVRA seeks to authorize 
this length of acting service equally for all Senate-confirmed inferior and 
principal officers, including Cabinet secretaries. 
Besides enacting the FVRA, Congress has acquiesced in other presidential 
conduct that does not conform to the narrowest reading of the Appointments 
Clause.  For example, President-elects make pre-inauguration, pre-
nomination announcements of nominees for high offices.264  The Senate acts 
as if these are presidential nominations from the start, referring these 
individuals to committee for confirmation hearings that take place pre-
inauguration.  This custom is so well entrenched and the expectations of such 
nominations so strong that on January 18, 2017, even though President 
Trump had not yet been inaugurated, his announcement of only twenty-
eight nominations prompted a Bloomberg headline: “The Empty Trump 
Administration.”265 
 
262. Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168. 
263. See id.; Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 9, 16 Stat. 162 (regarding Justice Department 
and Attorney General vacancies, and possible source for language later codified as Rev. Stat. 
179); Act of Feb. 6, 1891, ch. 113, 26 Stat. 733 (extending to thirty days); 4 Rev. Stat. §§ 177–
83 (1878) (enacted as 18 Stat. 1, 28–29) (containing some substantive changes not appearing 
in earlier statutes); Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 3348, 80 Stat. 426 (1966) (codifying thirty-day limit 
at 5 U.S.C. § 3348); Pub. L. No. 100-398, 102 Stat. 988 (1988) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 3348).  
See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 129, at 2–3 (discussing the changes in statutory limits). 
264. E.g., Associated Press, Obama Announces Final Cabinet Picks, NBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 
2008, 5:06 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/28308015/ns/politics-white_house/t/obam
a-announces-final-cabinet-picks/ (“President-elect wraps up Cabinet appointments before 
vacation in Hawaii.”). 
265. Jonathan Bernstein, Opinion, The Empty Trump Administration, BLOOMBERG. https:/
/www.bloombergquint.com/uselections/the-empty-trump-administration (last updated Jan. 
23, 2017, 9:08 PM).  Note that confirmation votes typically do not occur until the President 
has assumed office.  E.g., Confirmation Process Overview for Donald Trump’s Cabinet Nominees, 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Confirmation_process_overview_for_Donald_Trum 
p%27s_Cabinet_nominees (last visited Nov. 13, 2020) (noting pre-inauguration 
announcements and hearings for many nominees and post-nomination votes). 
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D. Working Around Confirmation from a Functional Perspective 
Overall, Congress has, since 1792, gestured expansively toward 
presidential flexibility to use acting officials, and Presidents have also used 
them since those early days.  This could mean little, of course, if Congress 
were uninterested in protecting the Senate’s prerogatives or if judges had no 
opportunity or inclination to engage the issues, which seems probable given 
the comparative lack of litigation over acting officials.266 
But the historical practice nonetheless underscores how unsatisfying it is 
to read the Appointments Clause in a “textually precise,” comparatively 
isolated manner to outright bar acting officials not confirmed for the post in 
Cabinet and other Senate-confirmed positions.267  As discussed, contrary to 
such an acontextual approach, the Constitution might admit multiple paths 
through the text, including that an acting official does not become an 
“officer” until particular conditions are met.  Meanwhile, the history around 
acting officials, combined with the obvious need for them given less-than-
instantaneous Senate confirmation decisions, suggests the need for 
constitutional analysis that is both broader and more functional. 
Adopting the narrowest view of the Appointments Clause—requiring any 
person exercising principal office powers to be “nominate[d]” by the 
President and Senate-confirmed268—would compel each President to begin 
her administration with headless Cabinet agencies unless previously 
confirmed Secretaries agreed to stay on.  But having an acting agency head 
in place, even an unconfirmed official, could be critical to proper Executive 
Branch function and a functioning administrative state.  Vacancies in certain 
high-level positions, particularly after deaths or unexpected resignations, 
may simply be intolerable if the Executive Branch is to do the work of 
modern government.  Moreover, adopting this narrow Appointments Clause 
reading also would mean finding unconstitutional the numerous statutes 
enacted since 1792 that provide stopgaps for vacancies in high-level offices, 
including the FVRA and many agency-specific statutes.269 
 
 
266.  E.g., NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 949 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“That the Senate voluntarily relinquished its advice-and-consent power in the FVRA does not 
make this end-run around the Appointments Clause constitutional.”); LaCroix, supra note 237. 
267. See supra text accompanying notes 39–40 (discussing arguments of Manning, Katyal, 
and Conway). 
268. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
269. Cf. Krotoszynski, supra note 174174, at 1536 (arguing that Breyer’s majority opinion 
interpreting Recess Appointment Clause, in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014), sought 
“an appropriate accommodation,” rather than “empowering the Senate to cripple the 
executive branch”). 
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In many respects, the problem is essentially pragmatic.  We must maintain 
the government’s core functions, a value embodied in the Take Care and 
Vesting Clauses, particularly when so many statutes authorize or even 
specifically require agencies to act.  We should take seriously a more holistic 
and functional constitutional reading under which Congress may authorize 
some service by acting officials while simultaneously ensuring a meaningful 
Senate advice and consent role. 
Such an approach would be partially consistent with the Supreme Court 
decision in United States v. Eaton, in that Eaton affirmed at least some 
presidential power to rely on unconfirmed officials in “special and 
temporary” conditions, though the Court has not further explicated either 
term.270  But a functional approach also would improve upon Eaton by more 
seriously engaging relevant considerations and clarifying the appropriate 
limits on presidential use of acting officials. 
Courts and scholars have taken similar functional approaches to other 
constitutional questions implicating the administrative state, such as the 
delegation of rulemaking power, an authority that resembles legislation in its 
effect, thus implicating Article I, Section I of the Constitution.271  All 
members of the Court have agreed that the Constitution permits such 
delegation if Congress has supplied an “intelligible principle.”272  Despite 
recent criticism that the scope of permitted delegation is too broad, no Justice 
has suggested that Congress resume responsibility for all governmental 
standard-setting.273  Much of this delegation has been justified in the 
literature and in the cases on functional grounds, since Congress “‘simply 
 
270.  United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898). 
271.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § I. 
272. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (“[W]e have ‘almost 
never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy 
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’” (quoting Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).  A majority of the Whitman Court 
characterized the power delegated to agencies to make broadly applicable rules with the force 
of law as executive.  Id. at 475 (“‘[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, 
inheres in most executive or judicial action.’” (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting))); see also Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904) (stating that legislation 
at issue “does not, in any real sense, invest administrative officials with the power of 
legislation”).  But see Whitman, 531 U.S. at 488–89 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that agency 
rules should be characterized as quasi-legislative, since “[t]he proper characterization of 
governmental power should generally depend on the nature of the power, not on the identity 
of the person exercising it”). 
273. E.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(arguing to strengthen nondelegation doctrine while reaffirming that Congress may assign 
power to “fill up the details” and find facts to Executive Branch). 
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cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general 
directives.’”274 
The Court has also approved as consistent with Article III generous 
delegations of adjudicative authority to agencies, noting the need to relieve 
the courts of “a most serious burden.”275  Even delegations to agencies to 
decide traditional private common law claims have been upheld conditioned 
on some federal court supervision.276 
Similarly, we might understand some limited power to rely upon acting 
officials in senior posts as “necessary and proper” to effectuate the President’s 
powers under the Take Care and Vesting Clauses.  The modern 
administrative state must function to implement statutory commands.  A 
busy Senate docket, plus the demands of the process itself, predictably 
precludes instantaneous confirmation. 
At the same time, a functionalist would recognize that such a scheme, even 
if it serves legitimate purposes, limits the Senate’s performance of its 
constitutionally assigned functions, presenting significant risks.277  A 
functionalist might consider whether the arrangement nonetheless 
“preserve[s] an appropriate balance” among the branches of government,278 
including interbranch checks and other means of assuring accountability.  
Analogously, as the administrative state has grown, presidential accountability 
 
274. Id. at 2123 (plurality opinion) (holding that delegation is needed “‘[i]n our 
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems’” 
quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372)); see also David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big 
Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 267 (2013) (noting conventional argument that “no 
practicable alternative to such administrative policymaking exists in a world as complex as our 
own”).  But see Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1463 (2015) (arguing that delegations undermine congressional 
function).  See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC 
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 148–52 (1997). 
275. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932). 
276. Id. at 49–50 (approving statutory scheme in which federal courts could set aside 
agency findings contrary to evidence); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (in approving 
delegation of adjudication authority to an agency, considering the “concerns that drove 
Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III,” including the extent to which 
delegation serves a legitimate governmental purpose, such as enhancing agency function) 
(citation omitted). 
277. Cf. Schor, 478 U.S. at 850 (noting in Article III challenge to delegation of adjudicative 
authority that the constitution bars congressional attempts to “emasculat[e]” the courts) 
(citation omitted). 
278. E.g., Manning, supra note 39, at 1950; id. at 1951 (“[F]unctionalists view their job as 
primarily to ensure that Congress has respected a broad background purpose to establish and 
maintain a rough balance or create tension among the branches.”). 
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has been identified as legitimizing rulemaking delegation to agencies.279  We 
should consider a similar analysis in assessing the constitutional tolerability of 
acting officials in Senate-confirmed posts. 
Although functional arguments are often perceived to support greater 
flexibility than text-based arguments, functional arguments, importantly, 
also can constrain.  Functional arguments might prompt us to conclude that 
the Constitution requires greater limits on the use of acting officials than 
current doctrine or statutes appear to permit.  For example, the Eaton Court’s 
approach of characterizing acting officials in principal officer roles  as 
something other than principal officers when they serve under “special and 
temporary conditions” has so far resulted in few, if any, particular limits.280  
“Temporary” implies some time limitation on service, but the Court has 
supplied no details or meaningful rationale.  By focusing specifically on such 
issues, a functional approach could result in a clearer articulation of 
constitutional limits, including identifying current statutes not consistent with 
the Constitution. 
Besides supporting courts in resolving the constitutional question, 
functional analysis could also inform congressional reform of acting service 
limitations.  It also could inform decisions structuring inferior officer 
positions, including whether to vest an inferior officer’s appointment in the 
President alone (or in the heads of agencies) or to retain the constitutional 
default Senate confirmation requirement.  Commentators have called for 
Congress to shrink the number of Senate-confirmed posts in the Executive 
Branch.281  The FVRA itself could be understood as Congress moving to vest 
more inferior officer appointments in the “President alone” under the 
Appointments Clause, since it gives the President significant flexibility to rely 
on acting appointments, but the FVRA does so only in a haphazard and 
obscure fashion.282  A functional analysis could provide greater clarity and 
rationality to congressional decisions on structuring inferior officers. 
I first turn to the functional advantages of acting officials in principal 
officer posts. 
 
279. E.g., MASHAW, supra note 276, at 152. 
280. See supra text accompanying notes 195–199 (discussing Eaton). 
281. See, e.g., LIGHT, supra note 24 (calling for reduction in Senate-confirmed posts).  
Partially responding to such concerns, the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and 
Streamlining Act of 2011 removed the confirmation requirement for roughly 160 positions.  
See Pub. L. No. 112-166, § 2, 126 Stat. 1283 (2012); S. Res. 116, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) 
(provides for expedited Senate consideration, without formal committee referral, of many 
agency Chief Financial Officers and others). 
282. See O’Connell, supra note 20, at 659. 
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1.  Stopgap Functions. 
At the most basic level, acting officials can help keep the trains moving, 
especially at a time when the implementation of critical federal missions 
depends very significantly on federal agency operation.283  Acting officials 
can step in and lead when the Defense Secretary, the EPA Administrator, or 
the Attorney General suddenly resigns, dies, or is removed.  Both nomination 
and confirmation take time284—more if the Senate is obstructionist—and the 
President must have senior agency personnel to respond to pressing 
challenges and to make implementation decisions that cannot wait.  This 
argument from core function also would support the Senate’s treatment of 
pre-inauguration announcements as effective nominations, avoiding headless 
agencies at an administration’s start. 
But arguments from exigency only justify a stopgap approach, not lengthy 
service—service long enough to enable a prompt White House nomination.  
Importantly, a stopgap justification would not seem to justify even the 
FVRA’s starter 210-day term for acting officials in principal officer roles, 
particularly Cabinet-level officials. 285 
2. Longer-Term Agency Function and Efficient Allocation of Executive Resources. 
What about longer-term acting service, perhaps as long as the FVRA’s 
210 days?  Permitting it would ensure the presence of senior agency 
leadership; though, it is less necessary because leaders could simply be 
nominated and confirmed. 
Beyond having a leader present, the impact on agency performance of 
an acting agency leader, compared with a Senate-confirmed individual, is 
uncertain.  Much depends on the particulars.  Especially when the acting 
individual heads the agency, the lack of Senate-approved leadership may 
hinder the agency’s effectiveness.  The agency may be less effective at 
advocating its views in the interagency process or before Congress;286 a 
Senate-confirmed head of an agency gives that agency more authority 
“throughout the government.”287  An acting official may be “perceived by 
 
283. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE FIFTH RISK (2018). 
284. O’Connell, supra note 24, at 1660 (22.9% of nominations submitted to the Senate 
from 1981–2014 failed); id. at 1669 (“On average, from 1981 through 2014, successful 
nominations took 88.5 days to be confirmed.”). 
285. 5 U.S.C. § 3346. 
286. Mendelson, supra note 103, at 1585–86, 1590 (arguing that White House officials 
might trust an acting civil servant’s decision less). 
287. E.g., Carrie Johnson, Obama Picks New Nominee for Legal Counsel’s Office, NPR (Jan. 5, 
2011, 4:50 PM), http://npr.org/2011/01/05/132681380/obama-picks-new-nominee-for-
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those around them as [not] having the full authority [of a duly confirmed 
officer.]”288 
On the other hand, depending on their agency-specific experience, 
qualifications and the tasks at hand, an acting official may positively impact 
agency function.  Especially if the acting official is a “senior and highly-
regarded leader[]” drawn from the agency’s career civil service (perhaps a 
first assistant or a long-serving civil servant),289 and if the agency’s challenges 
are comparatively implementation-related or technical, the acting official 
may perform well.290  A career deputy also may excel if stepping into a below-
Cabinet-level post, including heading a sub-Cabinet agency—think the 
DHS’s Transportation Security Administration or the DOI’s FWS.291  An 
experienced civil servant who is a competent, responsive leader may be more 
effective in overseeing program implementation than a newly arrived 
generalist political appointee.292 
But if the acting official is a “first assistant” who lacks long agency 
experience or is a recently arrived Schedule C appointee excepted from the 
competitive service,293 those benefits may disappear.  Such an acting official 
may lack both the interagency connections and significant experience with 
the agency mission often critical to strong performance. 
One also might anticipate difficulty if the career acting official’s policy 
preferences diverge significantly from the President’s and the official must 
 
legal-counsels-office (quoting former OLC head and current Harvard Law Professor, Jack 
Goldsmith). 
288. Lacking a Leader: Challenges Facing the SSA After over 5 Years of Acting Commissioners: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 115th Cong. 2 (2018), 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/WM/WM01/20180307/106947/HHRG-115-WM01-
Wstate-StierM-20180307.pdf (statement of Max Stier, President and CEO, Partnership for 
Public Service).  
289. Id.; see Mendelson, supra note 103, at 1597. 
290. For example, David Lewis found based on “PART” scores—a George W. Bush 
Administration measure of agency performance—that offices headed by careerists typically 
performed better than those headed by political appointees.  DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF 
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 
195–96 (2008). 
291. Mendelson, supra note 103, at 1584. 
292. See generally id. at 1586–87. 
293. E.g., Public Financial Disclosure Guide, U.S. OFF. OF GOV. ETHICS, https://www2.oge
.gov/Web/278eGuide.nsf/Content/Definitions~Schedule+C+Employee (explaining that a 
Schedule C employee is excepted from the competitive service and possesses a “close and 
confidential working relationship with the agency head or other top appointed 
official . . . rang[ing] from secretaries and chauffeurs to policy advisors”); see PLUM BOOK, 
supra note 11, app. 3 (describing Schedule C positions). 
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guide broader policy choices.  Although civil servants generally have had a 
reputation for loyalty to the President,294 divergence seems more likely when 
the acting official is the default “first assistant” choice under the FVRA, 
rather than presidentially selected.  Divergence also seems more likely when 
such an acting official must resolve prioritization issues or matters dominated 
by values, rather than technical issues. 
In short, the impact of long-term acting officials on agency performance 
is uncertain.  It may depend on the issues facing the agency and the 
individual’s characteristics, including whether the individual possesses 
significant agency experience or is an unseasoned newcomer. 
Separately, authorizing lengthier acting service might support greater 
personnel experimentation, in turn leading ultimately to better qualified 
individuals in these posts.  If the White House can more readily change 
leadership, unimpeded by the confirmation process, that might avoid “lock-
in” of a less-than-ideal official.295  The White House conceivably could easily 
implement the lessons learned regarding optimal qualifications for a 
particular principal officer.296 
But easing selection and replacement of high-level officials also may raise 
the risk, discussed elsewhere, that the President will make more patronage 
appointments, choose ill-qualified individuals, or select candidates motivated 
by goals unrelated to agency function, owing simply to reduced checks on 
such appointments. 
3. Conserving Presidential Resources. 
Authorizing longer-term acting officials also could enable the President to 
save the resources that would otherwise be expended on nomination and 
confirmation.  As with a legislative agenda, the President must “expend 
political capital, bargain, cajole, and engage in trade-offs” to get her 
nominees confirmed.297  With longer-term acting officials, the President in 
 
294. E.g., Russell E. Travers, Opinion, I’m a Former Civil Servant. We Are Professionals, Not a 
‘Deep State.’, WASH. POST (July 14, 2020, 5:34 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinio
ns/im-a-former-civil-servant-we-are-professionals-not-a-deep-state/2020/07/14/119b1280-
c5f0-11ea-b037-f9711f89ee46_story.html (describing civil service attitudes and noting, but 
dismissing, “deep state” concerns). 
295. E.g., George A. Krause & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Experiential Learning and Presidential 
Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency Leadership Appointments, 60 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 914, 915 (2016). 
296. But cf. Kinane, supra note 32, at 12 (“[C]ontraction priorities focus on shrinking the 
agency’s footprint.”). 
297. Gary J. Andres, The Contemporary Presidency: Parties, Process, and Presidential Power: 
Learning from Confirmation Politics in the U.S. Senate, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 147, 154 (2002). 
07. MENDELSON_FINAL_FORMATED (ARTICLE 1) (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2020  1:14 PM 
2020] MAY THE PRESIDENT WORK AROUND SENATE CONFIRMATION? 591 
theory could redirect resources to developing a substantive legislative or 
administrative agenda.298 
4. Democratic Responsiveness. 
Bypassing confirmation has conflicting effects on the democratic 
responsiveness of the administrative state.299  On one view, if a President 
chooses longer-term acting officials based on preferences, loyalty, or both,300 
the officials may operate the agencies more consistently with presidential 
preferences and, presumably, with public preferences expressed in the 
electoral process.  If present, this effect may be strongest following 
inauguration of a President’s first term, when the President’s democratic 
mandate is arguably clearest, and the President has a strong incentive to 
respond to electoral preferences.  The comparatively unfettered presidential 
ability to select acting officials may be the basis for President Trump’s 
statements that acting officials are “more ‘responsive.’”301 
A relatively broad authorization of acting agency officials might even be 
seen as a democratic safeguard against an obstructionist Senate.  Matthew 
Stephenson has argued that long-term Senate inaction on a presidential 
nominee ought to be construed as effective consent under some conditions,302 
but the argument could be broader.  Suppose, for example, that Senate 
leadership has indicated that it will simply refuse meaningful consideration, 
much as the Senate did with respect to a Supreme Court appointment by 
President Obama in 2016.303  Perhaps it could be argued that the President 
need not even bother with a formal nomination. 
 
298. Id. (“How much time should [the President] and his staff allocate to promoting 
nominees in Congress, including the required amount of bargaining and trade-offs, versus 
expending political capital on his core agenda?”). 
299. See Kate Andrias & Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and 
Organizing in an Era of Political Inequality, 130 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (“[N]early all 
democratic theorists consider responsiveness to constituents as an important feature of a 
functioning democracy.”) (draft at 21). 
300. E.g., Barron, supra note 48, at 1121. 
301. See Eilperin et al., supra note 13. 
302. See Stephenson, supra note 54, at 942 (challenging the assumption that an affirmative 
Senate vote is the only way for the Senate to provide the required advice and consent to 
nominate an appointee). 
303. It could be argued, of course, that a completely obstructionist Senate is also 
expressing democratic will to some extent—the will to interfere with Executive Branch 
function—though that seems in tension with the way in which the Founders envisioned the 
Senate functioning: as a reason-giving, deliberative body.  E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra 
note 241, at 485–87.  
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On the other hand, authorizing long-term acting officials means losing the 
substantial democratic contribution of the Senate confirmation process.304  
Even without the involvement of the House (the more democratic of 
Congress’s two chambers), and even with important obstacles to full 
inclusivity in American democratic processes305—the Senate often shows 
particular interest in a nominee’s public policy views.306 
First, Senators are elected, of course.  Votes on particular nominees are 
not infrequently salient to election campaigns, making the Senate process 
more responsive to voter preferences.307  As Professor Benjamin Eidelson has 
argued in defending Senate filibusters of judicial nominations as essentially 
majoritarian, even though a minority of Senators could halt a nomination, 
“[w]ithout them, there would often be no step in the confirmation process at 
which the elected representatives of a majority of the American people could 
veto a nomination.”308  With the filibuster’s abandonment for executive 
appointments in 2013, an outright majority of Senators now must vote either 
to close debate or to veto confirmation.309 
Further, the Senate confirmation process represents an important 
institutionalized space for elected officials to hold hearings, deliberate 
publicly, and give reasons regarding a particular confirmation decision.  All 
are important forms of democratic legitimation.310  Authorizing the President 
 
304. Some might argue that permitting a long-term acting official gives the Senate more 
choices in deciding whether to move forward with a nomination, but this choice is only 
possible when the President has submitted a nomination.  See O’Connell, supra note 20, at 702. 
305. See generally Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: 
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPS. ON POL. 564, 569–70 (2014) (discussing 
only weak accountability of elected officials to non-wealthy constituents). 
306. HENRY B. HOGUE & MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44083, 
APPOINTMENT AND CONFIRMATION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEADERSHIP: AN OVERVIEW 4 
(2015), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44083/4; see also NAT’L ACAD. OF 
PUB. ADMIN., A SURVIVOR’S GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 33 (2013) (summarizing 
types of questions that Senate committees often ask). 
307. E.g., Benjamin J. Hulac, Maine Sen. Susan Collins Becomes First Republican to Oppose 
Trump’s EPA Nominee, ROLL CALL (Feb. 27, 2019, 6:26 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/
congress/susan-collins-republican-oppose-epa-nominee (noting that Collins “likely will face a 
tough re-election race in 2020”). 
308. Benjamin Eidelson, The Majoritarian Filibuster, 122 YALE L.J. 980, 1020 (2013). 
309. See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on 
Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-
poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-
precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html. 
310. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 137 
(1996) (discussing procedural democracy and ensuring accountability); Robert Howse, 
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to select long-term acting officials unilaterally could come at a significant cost 
to this democratic legitimacy. 
5. Checking Appointee Malfeasance and Incompetence. 
Beyond contributing to democratic legitimacy, the Senate confirmation 
process of course represents a critical check on poor quality or self-serving 
appointments by the President.  Federalist No. 76 acknowledges the value of 
permitting “one man of discernment” to select officials, but nonetheless 
emphasizes the Senate as critical to guard against presidential “favoritism,” 
including through the nomination of unfit individuals.311  Again, the 
historical argument is that Senate advice and consent, together with that 
presidential nomination, are critical to assure that our most senior officials 
are above reproach, including free from ethical conflicts and qualified to run 
the government.312  The process ensures that officials may exercise major 
governmental authority only with the “blessing” of both institutions.313 
Nonetheless, we must consider the prospect that some checking functions 
could be performed elsewhere.  First, we might consider whether Executive 
Branch involvement could suffice to ensure that selected individuals are high 
quality and committed to the public interest.  A nominee for a Senate-
confirmed position must allow the Senate to assess her finances, national 
security risks, and general suitability.314  But unconfirmed individuals could 
also be screened in this way, potentially by the Office of Presidential 
Personnel (OPP) and Government Ethics, in addition to the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation.  Present rules require an acting official to obtain a security 
clearance, for example,315 though not generally to file a financial disclosure 
 
Democracy, Science and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 2329, 2334 (2000) (describing democracy as a “form of legitimation of power that 
depends on a conception of public justification and deliberative reason”). 
311. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 241, at 487. 
312. Id. 
313. Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 696, 736 (2007). 
314. See BARBARA L. SCHWEMLE ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40856, THE DEBATE 
OVER SELECTED PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANTS AND ADVISORS: APPOINTMENT, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 13–14 (2014) (explaining which 
presidential-appointed persons are required to file public financial disclosure reports). 
315. But see Brian Naylor, What You Need to Know about Security Clearances, Inside and Outside the 
White House, NPR (Mar. 1, 2019, 4:35PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/01/699407475/w
hat-you-need-to-know-about-security-clearances-inside-and-outside-the-white-hou (noting that 
a President may overrule staff to grant security clearances, though other than President Trump, 
expert attorney found “no other occasions where a President has actively involved himself in 
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form if the official is compensated at less than 120% of the rate normally paid 
to a GS-15 employee.316  Further, the OGE will evaluate a presidential 
nominee’s record, but because an FVRA-qualified “acting” officer is paid at 
the level of her original role, for example, she may be excluded from ethics 
reporting requirements that would otherwise apply to the office-holder.317 
The White House of course might choose to vet candidates for acting official 
appointments very carefully, considering expertise, integrity, ethics, and other 
issues of suitability for the position.318  A presidential preference to expand (or 
modify) government programs might prompt the Executive Branch to search 
for highly competent and experienced individuals.319  If so, we might have 
greater comfort overall with authorizing longer-term acting officials. 
Recent reports regarding the OPP, which dates to the Nixon 
Administration,320 have not been so positive, however.  The OPP vets 
potential high-level political appointees, ranging from Cabinet secretaries to 
Schedule C special assistants, including policy advisors and confidential 
assistants.321  The OPP has not been particularly stable—instead populated 
mainly by short-term political appointees, none Senate-confirmed—though, 
over time, it has increased its “professional executive recruitment 
capacity.”322  The OPP has long been under significant pressure from 
 
granting, or withdrawing a security clearance”); SCHWEMLE ET AL., supra note 314, at 14 (noting 
that certain employees of the President and Vice President may be exempted from the usual 
suitability checks and security clearances). 
316. SCHWEMLE ET AL., supra note 314, at 15 (summarizing financial disclosure 
requirements; further noting that financial disclosure may be required if particular agency 
duties necessitate it). 
317. See O’CONNELL, supra note 17, at 5. 
318. Suitability and national security checks are governed by 5 C.F.R. parts 731, 732, 
and 736.  See generally SCHWEMLE ET AL., supra note 314, at 12 & n.55 (discussing “[s]uitability 
checks and security clearances”). 
319. Cf. Kinane, supra note 32, at 30–31 (presidential interest in policy expansion 
correlated with reliance on interim appointees). 
320. The Nixon Administration originated the OPP; the Reagan Administration 
expanded its scope from selecting Cabinet secretaries to choosing non-career SES and Schedule 
C appointments.  JAMES PFIFFNER, THE WHITE HOUSE TRANSITION PROJECT, REPORT NO. 
2017-27, SMOOTHING THE PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF DEMOCRATIC POWER 6–7 (2017). 
321. See supra note 293 and accompanying text (discussing Schedule C positions); 
BRADLEY H. PATTERSON, TO SERVE THE PRESIDENT 95 (2008) (discussing OPP involvement 
in Schedule C position selection). 
322. PFIFFNER, supra note 320, at 9.  See generally Denis Slattery, Trump’s Presidential 
Personnel Office is Full of Young Staffers Who Vape and Drink on the Job, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 30, 
2018, 6:33 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/trump-personnel-office-
staffed-drinking-vaping-youngsters-article-1.3906238; Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Shawn 
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political organizations associated both with the President and with political 
parties to find patronage jobs for “loyalists,” including individuals and 
organizations heavily involved in the electoral process.323  The needs and 
talents of loyalists of course may not align with what agencies need for 
effective program implementation. 
Further, the OPP does not appear generally to rely on disciplined or 
transparent procedures, and no such procedures are required, impeding 
public monitoring of its decisions.324  As if to make the point, in the George 
H.W. Bush Administration, George W. Bush ran a committee to find 
positions for loyalists entitled the “Silent Committee.”325 
Meanwhile, a critical incentive for thorough Executive Branch vetting of 
an appointee’s qualifications and ethics is to avoid Senate confirmation 
trouble.  In connection with a Federal Reserve Bank nomination, two 
Republican Senators recently reminded the White House of the importance 
of “vetting, vetting, vetting,” prior to submitting a nominee’s name to the 
Senate.326  Senators also have objected to even considering a nomination 
 
Boburg, Behind the Chaos: Office that Vets Trump Appointees Plagued By Inexperience, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 30, 2018, 4:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/behind-the-
chaos-office-that-vets-trump-appointees-plagued-by-inexperience/2018/03/30/cde31a1a-
28a3-11e8-ab19-06a445a08c94_story.html; PLUM BOOK, supra note 11 at 2 (noting that the 
director of the OPP is not subject to Senate confirmation). 
323. THOMAS J. WEKO, THE POLITICIZING PRESIDENCY: THE WHITE HOUSE PERSONNEL 
OFFICE, 1948–1994, at 119–20 (1995); id. at 77 (stating that the office is “deeply engaged in 
[responding to] the organizations that dominate contemporary, postparty electoral politics”). 
324. Pfiffner explains that the OPP has essentially consolidated presidential control over 
appointments, though without tremendous transparency.  PFIFFNER, supra note 320, at 2–3.  
See O’Harrow, Jr. & Boburg, supra note 324 (“Little is publicly known or disclosed about the 
office’s inner workings under Trump.”). 
325. See PFIFFNER, supra note 320, at 7 (noting that “Silent Committee” was to ensure 
that loyalists were “taken care of”). 
326. See Jordain Carney, GOP Senator to White House on Fed Pick: ‘Please Do Some Research,’ 
HILL (May 2, 2019, 3:38 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/441874-gop-senator-
to-white-house-on-fed-pick-please-do-some-research (quoting Sen. Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) and 
reporting on Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.)); Associated Press, Lax Vetting of Trump Nominees 
Begins to Frustrate Some Senators, CBS NEWS (Apr. 25, 2018, 1:34 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/lax-vetting-of-trump-nominees-begins-to-frustrate-some-
senators/; Catherine Rampell, Opinion, Americans, It’s Time for Some Extreme Vetting, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 5, 2018, 7:42 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/americans-its-
time-for-some-extreme-vetting/2018/04/05/e3aeb376-390c-11e8-9c0a-
85d477d9a226_story.html; see also Mendelson, Uncertain Effects, supra note 103, at 1576 
(“Continuing delays in confirmation may prompt the White House to further investigate 
nominees and pre-vet candidates with the relevant Senate committees . . . .”). 
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when they perceive inadequate pre-nomination process and consultation.327  
Thus, permitting greater reliance on acting officials—bypassing Senate 
confirmation altogether—may significantly reduce the Executive Branch’s 
incentive to thoroughly vet potential appointees. 
 Meanwhile, for a formally nominated official, the Senate can gather its 
own information on an appointee’s history, finances, and ethics.328  Some 
political scientists have characterized Senate confirmation as a “rigorous 
vetting process” overall.329  Of course, Senate confirmation is no guarantee 
of thoroughness.  The Senate’s consideration of many appointees is merely 
routine, though others may receive hearings and consideration in floor 
debate.330  Particularly when the Senate and President are of the same party, 
some Senate confirmation decisions might be criticized as cursory and little 
more than rubberstamping. 
On the other hand, senatorial accountability to constituents for 
confirmation votes can prompt Senators to exercise independent judgment.331  
Nor are all nominations approved.  As O’Connell has documented, roughly 
23% of what she calls “nonroutine” nominations to agency positions 
historically have failed in the Senate, either because they are voted down, 
withdrawn, or returned to the President at the end of a session.332  
Renominating the same person to an agency position in a later congressional 
session is “not typical,”333 and the rate of failure has increased in recent 
years.334  In short, the Senate confirmation process overall—including the 
anticipated threat of failure in that process—remains a very significant force 
for the careful choice of high-level Executive Branch officials. 
 
327. HOGUE & CAREY, supra note 304, at 2. 
328. Id. at 3–4; e.g., PFIFFNER, supra note 320, at 25 (explaining nominees to Senate-
confirmed posts “must survive vetting by the OPP, a national security investigation by the 
FBI, and financial scrutiny by the Office of Government Ethics;” meanwhile, “[Senate] 
committees have their own questionnaires that duplicate much of the information required 
by the executive branch”). 
329. ROGER H. DAVIDSON ET AL., CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 323 (14th ed. 2013). 
330. HOGUE & CAREY, supra note 306, at 4 (noting some, but not all committees, hold 
hearings); ELIZABETH RYBICKI, CONG. RSCH SERV., RL31980, SENATE CONSIDERATION OF 
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS: COMMITTEE AND FLOOR PROCEDURE 5, 9 (2017). 
331. Cf. Sheryl Gay Stolberg et al., Interest Groups Turn up Pressure on Senators Before 
Kavanaugh Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2N4Q5uC. 
332. O’Connell, supra note 24, at 1654, 1660 (expressing 3.2% were withdrawn by the 
President, a “handful” were presumably voted down, and the rest were returned to the 
President).  O’Connell notes that the “failure rate is generally rising by administration.”  Id. 
at 1660. 
333. Id. at 1668. 
334. Id. at 1659–60, 1659 n.57. 
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6. Public Accountability as a Safeguard. 
Even without the Senate confirmation process, the President’s political 
accountability might deter poor quality acting appointments.335  For example, 
press coverage exposing abuse of the office resulted in the departures of 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tom Price, in 2017 and EPA 
Administrator, Scott Pruitt, in 2018.336  Meanwhile, the Trump White House 
withdrew the nomination of Ronnie Jackson, the President’s personal 
physician, to head the Department of Veterans Affairs after stories broke 
about misconduct, including Jackson’s generous hand with sleeping pills to 
reporters on Air Force One.337  The White House also never nominated John 
Dunkin, the President’s personal pilot, to head the Federal Aviation 
Administration following public discussion of his qualifications.338  In none of 
these cases did the Senate confirmation process play a direct role in ensuring 
accountability.  Price and Pruitt were both already confirmed when the stories 
broke.339  Neither Jackson nor Dunkin had progressed to formal nomination, 
though the prospect of Senate confirmation failure could have deterred that 
nomination.  Instead, public visibility appeared to supply the check. 
The value of such checks may be reduced in a President’s second term, 
however, and they are also likely to operate mainly at the Cabinet level.  Acting 
appointments and appointments below the Cabinet level may draw relatively 
little public attention.  For example, consider the examples above involving 
 
335. E.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE 
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at x–xvi, 209 (2012) (arguing that a variety of mechanisms constrain 
the President). 
336. Peter Baker et al., Health Secretary Tom Price Resigns After Drawing Ire for Chartered Flights, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2fEBLtd; Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, Scott 




337. Lisa Rein et al., Ronny Jackson Withdraws as Trump’s Nominee to Lead Veterans Affairs, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 26, 2018, 12:47 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ronny-jackson-
withdraws-as-trumps-nominee-to-lead-veterans-affairs/2018/04/26/5a343806-48f6-11e8-
9072-f6d4bc32f223_story.html; Eliana Johnson et al., Jackson Troubles Shine Light on a Fact of 
Washington Life: Sleeping Pills, POLITICO (Apr. 25, 2018, 5:04 PM), https://www.politico.com/sto
ry/2018/04/25/ronny-jackson-nomination-va-sleeping-pills-553127. 
338. Isaac Stanley-Becker, Trump Wanted His Personal Pilot to Head the FAA. The Critical Job 
is Still Vacant Amid Boeing Fallout, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2019, 4:44 AM), https://www.washi
ngtonpost.com/nation/2019/03/14/trump-wanted-his-personal-pilot-head-faa-critical-job-
is-still-vacant-amid-boeing-fallout/. 
339 See supra note 336. 
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individuals “exercising the authority” of Senate-confirmed posts at DHS, the 
NPS, and the SSA, all agencies comparatively well known to the public.  While 
scattered articles were written, these cases received little, if any, focused public 
or congressional attention.  Perhaps both the Senate and the public are 
acquiescing in the choice of reasonable acting officials.  But more likely, absent 
a significant scandal or complaints from well-organized stakeholders, there is 
relatively little public monitoring of below-Cabinet appointments. 
7. Judicial Review and Other Institutional Safeguards. 
Judicial review and other safeguards might, in theory, represent ex post 
checks on poor decisions by an unconfirmed official.  Senate confirmation, 
of course, is only an ex ante check on the official’s performance.  Meanwhile, 
judicial review provides only a very limited check.  Judicial review typically 
is available only for final agency actions, such as rulemaking or adjudication.  
Courts generally will not review agency reorganization, resource allocation, 
or prioritization decisions;340 decisions not to enforce;341 or a host of other 
important agency decisions.  For example, a district judge hearing a 
challenge to asylum policies issued by Ken Cuccinelli (as he claimed to “act” 
as USCIS Director), found that the court lacked jurisdiction to review a 
“significant change in policy” that was not reduced to writing.342  Meanwhile, 
litigation against acting officials is relatively rare in any event.343  
Other institutions also might serve to check poor performance of agency 
duties by unconfirmed individuals, including a civil service guided by 
professional norms344 or supervisors within the agencies.345  It is worth 
emphasizing, however, that our concern here is with decisions of a long-term 
 
340. E.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192–93 (1993) (finding agency allocation of 
funds from lump-sum appropriation to be unreviewable exercise of agency discretion). 
341. E.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 825, 837–38 (1985) (holding that agency 
decisions not to enforce are presumptively not reviewable under the APA). 
342. See L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12, 19 (D.D.C. 2020) (terming policy 
as “third, significant change in policy,” but finding no jurisdiction over unwritten policies). 
343. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (cataloging cases). 
344. Barron, supra note 48, at 1104 (“[C]ivil servants may successfully push their own 
agenda . . . .”); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2345 (2006) (arguing that bureaucratic wisdom stems 
from “tradition-bound professionalism”); Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—
Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 77–85 (2017); Jon 
D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 543–47 (2015). 
345. Cf. Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
1285, 1324–25 (2014) (discussing the various forces within agencies that keep them compliant 
with the law). 
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acting official who can exercise every power associated with the office.  Civil 
service norms may restrain abusive or misguided agency decisions mainly 
when the acting official is herself a civil servant, such as a career deputy, or 
when significant civil service work is required to support new policy 
initiatives.346  Meanwhile, not all civil servants supply wise “tradition-bound 
professionalism,” as articulated by Neal Katyal,347 limiting their effectiveness 
as a check on poor leadership.  And in agencies where the acting officials are 
recently arrived political appointees and the civil service is fleeing for the 
exits, civil service norms are unlikely to be an effective check.348  Reports of 
greater White House control over policy in the Obama and Trump 
Administrations, including through “policy czars,” also seem likely to reduce 
any moderating influence of career civil service agency officials.349 
Supervision could usefully check malfeasance by acting officials, but it 
requires a supervisor.  Thus, the prospect of supervision represents little 
reassurance regarding acting Cabinet agency heads, though White House 
oversight, even if stretched thin, could be of some use.  Supervision may be 
more useful for a principal officer below the level of Cabinet secretary, such 
as an acting assistant secretary; head of a subcabinet agency, such as the 
Federal Highway Administration; or ambassador working under State 
Department auspices.  In short, supervision and judicial review may impose 
only very limited accountability upon unconfirmed officials, especially at the 
highest levels. 
8. Effect on Senate Oversight and Deliberation. 
Finally, we might consider that more broadly authorizing acting officials 
could save limited Senate resources.  Perhaps the Senate would have greater 
 
346. E.g., Mendelson, supra note 103, at 1596–98 (explaining that career civil servants 
bring crucial experience to the carrying out of agency projects). 
347. See Katyal, supra note 344, at 2345 (“Wisdom requires tradition-bound 
professionalism.”). 
348. Jack Corrigan, The Hollowing-Out of the State Department Continues, ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/tillerson-trump-state-for
eign-service/553034/; e.g., O’Connell, supra note 20, at 713 n.546 (“The civil service is in crisis.”). 
349. Leo Shane III, Former VA Secretary Details Dysfunction, Chaos Within the Trump 
Administration, MIL. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-
congress/2019/10/17/former-va-secretary-details-dysfunction-chaos-within-the-trump-
administration/ (describing White House officials calling veterans policy meetings without 
inviting Secretary of Veterans Affairs); e.g., Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy 
and the Law of the White House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2577–78 (2011) (noting the 
Obama-era appointment of many czars, “where the more experienced and higher-profile 
policymaker serves as ‘czar’ and the junior in the Cabinet”). 
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latitude to prioritize legislative initiatives or conduct targeted agency 
oversight.  And reduced demand for confirmation decisions might translate 
to higher quality Senate deliberation on the nominations that are submitted. 
But cutting back on confirmation would also be costly for the Senate’s key 
oversight function.  Congressional oversight of the agencies has been 
regularly criticized as ad hoc.  Although some political scientists have 
famously defended “fire-alarm” oversight as just as efficient as so-called 
“police-patrol oversight,”350 such congressional oversight may respond more 
to publicly reported scandals or demands from well-organized, well-funded 
constituents than to areas of greatest need.351 
By contrast, confirmation hearings, particularly for Cabinet officers, 
valuably enable more systematic agency oversight.  In hearings, Senators 
may not only assess nominee qualifications but also “articulate policy 
perspectives or raise related oversight issues.”352  For example, the 
confirmation hearing for Gina Haspel to lead the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) became a vehicle for broader discussion of CIA practices and 
policies.353  Similarly, at the confirmation hearing for Scott Gottlieb to head 
the FDA, Senate committee members focused on the FDA’s role in 
addressing opioid abuse.354  As political scientists have documented, 
“senators use their confirmation power to wield influence over executive 
branch priorities.”355  Nothing stops the Senate from conducting oversight, 
of course.  But without confirmation hearings, Senate oversight of agencies 
seems likely to adhere to its usual haphazard patterns. 
 
 
350. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 175–76 (1984) (arguing that what appears to 
be a “neglect of oversight is really a preference—an eminently rational one—for fire-alarm 
oversight”); Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis 
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
205, 209–10 (1991). 
351. E.g., Richard J. Anderson, Interest-Driven Oversight and the Failure of 
Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy (2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan), 
at https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/116670 (describing the influence interest 
groups have over elected officials). 
352. HOGUE & CAREY, supra note 306, at 4. 
353. See Rosenberg et al., supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the 
motivations behind questions asked during Gina Haspel’s confirmation hearing). 
354. E.g., Thomas Sullivan, Senate Holds Confirmation Hearing on Gottlieb, POL’Y & MED., 
https://www.policymed.com/2017/04/senate-holds-confirmation-hearing-on-gottlieb.html 
(last updated May 4, 2018) (showing how a confirmation hearing may be used as a proxy to 
conduct agency oversight). 
355. DAVIDSON, supra note 329, at 320. 
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 Overall, a functional analysis suggests that authorizing the President to 
appoint unconfirmed individuals to exercise the authority of positions 
normally subject to Senate confirmation, even Cabinet secretaries, seems 
warranted as a stopgap for vacancies in view of the ordinary time required 
for nomination and confirmation.  Meanwhile, allowing a President to rely 
long-term on officials unconfirmed for the post—rather than requiring 
nominations and a Senate process—has much less justification and presents 
significant risks.  Executive institutions may vet such officials less without a 
looming Senate confirmation process.  Moreover, political accountability 
seems particularly lacking for lower-level acting officials.  Judicial review of 
individual decisions also seems unlikely to serve as an effective ex post check 
upon poor appointments given the relatively limited judicial review of 
agency operations.356 
 Thus, the analysis implies that only very brief acting service for Cabinet-
level officials should be considered consistent with constitutional limits, with 
somewhat longer service for lower level principal officer posts.  The following 
section offers a more detailed assessment. 
III. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR  
REFORM 
A functional analysis of the acting officers problem leads naturally to 
important conclusions regarding the Appointments Clause’s constraints 
upon acting officials.  First, the best justification for interpreting the 
Constitution to permit acting officers in principal officer positions, such as 
Cabinet secretary roles, is the stopgap function—a value supported in the 
Take Care and Vesting Clauses.  But given the risks inherent in permitting 
the President to unilaterally select an acting officer without the check of 
Senate confirmation, that rationale can only justify a very short term of 
acting service that is long enough to support a prompt presidential 
nomination.  Courts should conclude that lengthy service without such a 
nomination, including service under the FVRA’s “starter” period of 210 
days, is simply too long and, thus, in violation of the Appointments Clause.  
Similarly lengthy service under agency-specific statutes with no express time 
limitations also should be understood to violate the Appointments Clause.  
Finally, the Constitution also should be understood to limit an agency head’s 
use of general delegation statutes to delegate a Senate-confirmed office’s 
responsibilities to an unconfirmed individual, since this practice amounts to 
creating a shadow acting official.   
 
356. See supra text accompanying notes 340–341 (citing Lincoln v. Vigil and Heckler v. Chaney). 
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From the constitutional perspective, a stopgap-based authorization for 
acting Cabinet secretaries, in view of the scope of their authorities and 
comparatively few checks on their powers, should only be for a short 
period—thirty days presumptively, with a possible extension to forty days at 
the outset of an Administration given the need to fill multiple positions.357  
Thirty days was the time limit until 1988.358  Presidential nomination of 
Cabinet secretaries can feasibly be completed in this timeframe, even at the 
outset of an administration.  Major presidential campaigns already invest 
significant pre-election effort in identifying candidates for senior positions; 
they can also plan for transition prior to inauguration.359 
Beyond a short period of thirty to forty days, however, the Appointments 
Clause should not be interpreted to authorize any further acting service by 
unconfirmed individuals in Cabinet-level principal officer roles unless the 
President has submitted a nomination package to the Senate.  Given the 
power of these officers, the Senate confirmation process remains a critical 
safeguard.  Even with Executive Branch vetting, the opportunity for Senate 
consideration is essential to deter the selection of incompetent or corrupt 
principal officers or patronage appointees, and to regularly oversee agency 
performance. 
For principal officers at other levels, possibly including supervised 
principal officers at the Deputy Secretary level, heads of subcabinet agencies, 
and ambassadors, the functional analysis could yield a different outcome.  
Because these unconfirmed individuals are generally subject to greater 
supervision, we might perceive fewer overall risks from malfeasance.  
Meanwhile, the President must fill many more such posts, requiring more 
time and resources.  Courts accordingly should interpret the Constitution’s 
Appointments Clause to allow greater presidential latitude to rely on an 
acting official in a lower level post prior to submitting a nomination, though 
the courts should still confine such latitude to 120 days—much less than the 
FVRA’s 210-day starter period—and consistent with the time limit that 
appeared in the Vacancies Act of 1988. 
 A functional analysis could also guide legislative reform.  Congress could 
simply adopt the thirty-day and 120-day limits in legislation authorizing 
acting officials in Cabinet-level and below-Cabinet level posts, respectively, 
 
357. Cf. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 527 (2014) (interpreting appointments 
under Recess Appointments Clause to be available only for Senate recesses of “substantial 
length,” presumptively not less than ten days). 
358. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (listing history of session laws that changed  
the statutory provision limiting time for filling Cabinet posts). 
359. See generally P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV., MAKING GOVERNMENT WORK FOR THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 6, 10–11 (2016) (outlining best practices for presidential transitions). 
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plus the length of time a nomination is pending in the Senate.360  Such 
legislative reform should extend to agency-specific statutes.  Authorizing 
different time periods for the Cabinet-level and below-Cabinet-level officials 
would, of course, require drawing a clearer line between Cabinet-level 
principal officers and all other principal officers.  To address the prospect of 
Senate recalcitrance, however, statutes should authorize an acting official to 
remain once the President has submitted a nomination to the Senate. 
Congress also might consider generally requiring that, where possible, a 
Senate-confirmed deputy in the same agency serve as the acting Cabinet-level 
official.  This person is confirmed not only to serve in the same agency but to 
a role adjacent to the Secretary.  The initial Senate confirmation might not 
have precisely addressed the person’s suitability for the Cabinet secretary role 
and would not have accounted for performance in the deputy role, but it still 
can represent something of a check on core issues of integrity, competence, 
and expertise in the agency’s mission.  These functional considerations may 
help explain greater comfort among commentators with acting Cabinet-level 
service by confirmed deputies361 and Congress’s choices in many statutes to 
identify confirmed deputy secretaries as acting Cabinet secretaries.362 
Current statutory structures do not authorize a deputy secretary simply to 
rise into the role of Secretary without nomination and confirmation,363 and 
the Appointments Clause might not authorize such a statute given the 
significant increase in power.  As implied by the withdrawn nomination of 
already-confirmed Defense Deputy Secretary, Patrick Shanahan, for 
Secretary of Defense following reports of family violence, the confirmation 
process for a Secretary-level position may be more extensive and thorough 
than for a lower-level position.364  But Senate confirmation in the adjacent 
 
360. Bauer and Goldsmith state that an “acting [officer] should be able to serve 120 days 
in office, with one renewal for a failed nomination, and then no more after that.”  BAUER & 
GOLDSMITH, supra note 147, at 330–331.  Their recommendation, like mine, would limit the use 
of acting officers significantly compared with current law.  They do not, however, distinguish 
between Cabinet-level and other officials.  Nor do they tackle the problem of Senate recalcitrance. 
361.  See Dellinger & Lederman, supra note 40 (explaining that it is longstanding practice 
for a Senate-confirmed deputy to be acting Secretary).  These functional advantages would 
be less significant if the acting official had been confirmed to a long-ago role or one in a 
different agency.   
362. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7132(a) (identifying Senate-confirmed deputy Secretary of 
Energy, and stating such deputy “shall act” if the Secretary position becomes vacant). 
363. E.g., id. (stating merely that the Senate-confirmed deputy “shall act” but not ascend 
if the Secretary position becomes vacant). 
364. Michael D. Shear & Helene Cooper, Shanahan Withdraws as Defense Secretary Nominee, 
and Mark Esper is Named Acting Pentagon Chief, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2W
We0Bq. 
07. MENDELSON_FINAL_FORMATED (ARTICLE 1) (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2020  1:14 PM 
604 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW [72:4 
role should signal that the person’s service as an acting secretary presents 
fewer risks and provides greater value.  Moreover, providing that deputy 
secretaries should generally serve as acting secretaries might improve Senate 
deliberation over a deputy secretary because the Senate could fairly 
anticipate the individual’s potential service as an acting secretary. 
Turning back to the problem with which this paper began, it is the 
functional considerations—rather than an analysis rooted in Appointments 
Clause text, say—that best explain arguments advanced by commentators 
that Senate-confirmed Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein was the 
proper choice for acting Attorney General when Attorney General Sessions 
left his post, rather than Matthew Whitaker, who was not confirmed for any 
closely related post at the Justice Department.365  On functional criteria, 
Rosenstein’s choice would have presented fewer risks. 
Even if acting service by confirmed deputies raises fewer concerns under a 
functional analysis, clear time limits remain critical.  Time limits are 
important given the extent of a Secretary’s power, relative lack of supervision, 
and the prospect that presidential reliance on an acting official is unjustified 
by genuine need but is simply to circumvent the Appointments Clause. 
The prospect of Senate recalcitrance is, of course, serious, and perhaps 
explains why Presidents have sometimes not submitted nominations for vacant 
posts.  But one implication of this Article’s analysis is that the Senate must have 
an opportunity to perform its checking function.  Thus, the President must at 
least submit a nomination to the Senate.  Once that is done, the FVRA’s 
extension of authorized acting service while a nomination is pending is a 
reasonable start to addressing Senate delays.366  Such an indefinite extension 
still raises the risks posed by the occupying of Senate-confirmed posts by 
 
365. E.g., Dellinger & Lederman, supra note 40 (arguing from “constitutional 
avoidance”).  Conceivably, the role of acting Attorney General (though not the Attorney 
General role) could be considered “germane” to Rosenstein’s position as Deputy Attorney 
General, see id., but the germaneness analysis itself is essentially functional in nature. 
366. 5 U.S.C. § 3346.  None of these proposals, including my own, address the—ideally 
rare—prospect of Senate collusion with the President to delay confirmation hearings on a 
nomination.  Such collusion might result in an unvetted acting official being left in place or 
the confirmation of an individual in a lower-level position with the expectation, say, that the 
person will act as Cabinet secretary.  Such concerns might apply to the party-line vote to 
confirm Chad Wolf to be an undersecretary at DHS with the understanding that he would 
immediately rise to the post of acting Secretary for Homeland Security.  E.g., Nick Miroff, 
Chad Wolf Sworn in as Acting Department of Homeland Security Chief, Ken Cuccinelli to be Acting Deputy, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2019, 7:47 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/cha
d-wolf-sworn-in-as-acting-department-of-homeland-security-chief-fifth-under-trump/2019/
011/13/6633a614-0637-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html (commenting that senators 
voted fifty-four to forty-one to confirm him for a different job, “largely along party lines”). 
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unconfirmed individuals, but the Senate could reduce such risks by acting on 
the presidential nomination.  Others, including Matthew Stephenson, have 
suggested solutions worth considering for significant Senate recalcitrance.367 
Finally, consider inferior officers.  Here, the 210-day FVRA authorization 
of acting service without Senate confirmation is constitutionally permissible, 
since such positions need not be filled by Senate-confirmed officials at all.  
And it may be that Senate confirmation realistically is not needed for these 
officials; supervision may be sufficient.  But the FVRA’s effective 
restructuring of such appointments is backhanded at best, because 
presidential choices or simple inaction might end up dictating which offices 
will or will not be occupied by Senate-confirmed officials.  Instead, perhaps 
informed by the functional analysis above, and following its success with the 
Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, Congress 
should directly deliberate over which Executive Branch positions should be 
subject to Senate confirmation. 
The analysis here suggests several other reforms as well.  First, Congress 
might more thoughtfully set eligibility requirements for acting principal 
officers.  Currently, the FVRA’s default is to the “first assistant,” for example, 
but the FVRA requires no agency experience or other qualifications for that 
person to serve.  The FVRA also authorizes the President to designate a civil 
servant, paid at a level of GS-15 or higher, and that person need only have 
worked at the agency for ninety days.  If no Senate-confirmed deputy is 
available, Congress could limit acting officer eligibility to those with 
significant agency-specific experience predating the vacancy.  Such a change 
might increase the likelihood that senior career officials will serve as acting 
officials, with probable benefits for agency function.368  Congress might also 
more specifically limit the time of service by an inexperienced individual. 
Congress also should attend to the particular tasks carried out by acting 
officials.  Especially for Cabinet officials, Congress might specifically consider 
whether certain tasks simply should be undertaken only by a duly confirmed 
principal officer. 
Congress also should clearly restrict the wholesale delegation of a vacant 
Senate-confirmed position’s powers, as this practice has effectively created a 
new class of pseudo-acting officials subject to neither time nor qualifications 
limits.  It should go without saying that a Senate-rejected nominee should 
not be able to exercise the powers of the office by receiving a delegation.  
Congress conceivably might deem permissible narrow delegations of 
individual authorities if accomplished significantly prior to the vacancy, 
consistent with traditional practice, or under particular conditions of need.  
 
367. See Stephenson, supra note 54. 
368. See supra text accompanying notes 289–291. 
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Such an approach might allow some exigencies to be addressed while not 
seriously undermining the Senate confirmation process. 
Finally, Congress might consider other solutions to the acting officials 
problem to reduce risks associated with an unconfirmed acting Cabinet 
secretary.  For example, Congress could create a “shadow cabinet,” in which 
the President nominates and the Senate confirms “backup” Cabinet 
officials.369  Such individuals could be confirmed to serve in case of Cabinet-
level vacancies and occupy posts elsewhere in the meantime.  This is a variant 
of the proposal to specifically require Senate-confirmed deputy officials to 
serve as acting Cabinet officials in those agencies370 pending Senate 
confirmation of a presidential nominee.371  Again, however, service by such 
individuals should be subject to strict time limitations. 
The administrative state has long been a central feature of American 
government, raising recurring issues of accountability, democratic 
responsiveness, legitimacy, and institutional structure.  The acting officials 
problem usefully focuses us on the tug-of-war over the role agency leaders 
play—whether conduits for democratic accountability, technical knowledge, 
or both—and how they are best chosen.  A functional approach to the 
Appointments Clause in context must take account of the genuine need for 
presidential flexibility to support institutional function, but also honor the need 
for Senate confirmation to ensure that agency leaders are highly qualified, 
appropriately democratically responsive, and above reproach.  Current 
Appointments Clause doctrine should be clarified and statutes reformed to 
limit presidential reliance on acting officials and ensure that the President 
properly nominates officials for Senate confirmation. 
 
 
369. Thanks to Dan Epps and Anne Joseph O’Connell, both of whom suggested variants 
of this idea in conversation.  See also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Mitu Gulati, “Mr. Presidential 
Candidate: Whom Would You Nominate?,” 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 293, 295–96 (2009) (outlining a 
process to make presidential candidates propose nominees for Cabinet positions). 
370. Currently, nearly all major agencies have a Senate-confirmed deputy position, 
including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and 
Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice, 
Labor, Transportation, Treasury, and Veterans’ Affairs, as well as the EPA, and the Small 
Business Administration.  The Department of State has Senate-confirmed undersecretaries.  
Neither the General Services Administration, the Office of Government Ethics, nor the CFPB, 
however, have Senate-confirmed deputies.  See generally PLUM BOOK, supra note 11 (listing federal 
government positions that require Senate confirmation). 
371. See Shear & Cooper, supra note 364. 
